[FULL] Article 5, Volume 4 Issue 2

Online disclosure of intellectual capital: an analysis of the Iberian banks?

Author

Maria de Lurdes Ribeiro da Silva

Maria do Rosário Meireles Ferreira Cabrita

Ana Maria Gomes Rodrigues

María del Pilar Muñoz Dueñas

Abstract

Based upon an empirical-positivistic methodology, and resorting to the content analysis of the webpages through the application of an innovative index of disclosure based on the European models Intellectus and InCas, built specifically to analyze the disclosure of intellectual capital in the banking sector, we studied the disclosure of intellectual capital of the eighty-six banks operating in Portugal and Spain in 2016.  The empirical results revealed that the banks in Portugal and Spain have disclosed an average value of 0.2355 of information on intellectual capital through their webpages in 2016. Relational capital was the component these organizations most disclosed with an average of 0.4529, followed by the disclosure of structural capital, and lastly, human capital. The use of a particular index of disclosure about intellectual capital applied to the singularity of the banking sector that covers two peripheral countries in Southern Europe, reveal to be the most contribute to the literature.

Keywords

1.        Introduction

Intellectual capital is a subject of growing interest for professionals, researchers from academia, and for accounting standard setters.

This present paper aims to analyse the extent of disclosure of intellectual capital through the webpages, as well as each of its components or categories, more specifically, human capital, structural capital and relational capital, of the banks operating in Portugal and Spain.

For that purpose, we have applied an index built specifically for the disclosure of information of intellectual capital, based on the most recent European models of measurement and report of intellectual capital. By using this particular disclosure index, which reflects what we consider to be the most relevant information in the field of intellectual capital in the banking sector, we aim to contribute to a wider analysis of this topic, in order to reach greater rigor, transparency and reliability in the disclosure of this singular sector, which is focus of attention of many stakeholders.

Furthermore, we believe that it is important to evaluate the tendency of the disclosure of intellectual capital via the webpages made by Iberian banking institutions, because of the increasing importance that the internet presently holds, due to its’ fast, economical and visible propagation of information. Given the similar economic and social characteristics of these two countries, the joint analysis of the banks operating in Portugal and in Spain allows us to have a better perception of the disclosure in this sector. We do not intend to make a comparison between these two countries, but rather to obtain a broader analysis to make up for the limitation of the small number of banks in each country. Thus, we aim to reveal how the banking sector views the disclosure of its intellectual capital through a means of communication that is available to all of its stakeholders.

The present research begins with a conceptual framework on intellectual capital and its’ application in the banking sector, followed by the presentation of the model applied, detailing its’ indicators of disclosure. Then it follows with a reference to the research methodology used, with the research issues applied, as well as the presentation of the banks studied. We followed with the presentation and analysis of the results obtained after applying statistical techniques, and we close with the main conclusions reached in the study.

2.        Conceptual framework and review of the Literature

2.1.      Intellectual capital in modern day organizations

In modern day organizations, there is a greater use of mental force, and change occurs at a very fast rate, and therefor intellectual and organizational capacities requiring more creativity, talent and competencies are more important than the control of physical resources. Businesses of the knowledge-based economy have changed the traditional organizational structure arriving at a new form of organisational design: the network (Stewart, 1997). Lev (2003) describes the “new economy” as an economy based on the globalization and introduction of new markets and the de-materialization of production, where information and communications technologies, especially the internet, play a very important role, creating a network economy with an intensive use of knowledge and innovation in the production of goods and services.

The dramatic growth of intangible factors is the result of the progress that occurred in the worldwide panorama in the last decades of the twentieth century, accounting for this situation, namely the large fusions and acquisitions operations, the growth in the services sector, the sophistication of technologies and of markets, and the strong client orientation (Rodrigues, 2006 and 2011).

 Intellectual capital is categorized in literature into three components: human capital, structural capital and relational capital. Human capital has a particular characteristic, which is the impossibility of separating this type of intangible assets from the people undertaking them, it is the knowledge that employees take with them when they leave the company. Besides the knowledge acquired by each person, it includes other individual characteristics such as loyalty, polyvalence, or flexibility, that increment productivity and the value of the individual’s contribution to the organization (Cañibano et al., 2008). Human capital represents, therfor, the source of innovation and renewal (Stewart, 1997), that is, the main source of heterogeneity of companies (Cabrita, 2009).

Structural capital is a strategic asset that contains a group of infrastructures, information systems, data bases, patents, trademarks, routines, and administrative processes that represent the intellectual potential that exists in the organization (Cabrita, 2009). It is, therefore, a part of the knowledge that remains in the company at the end of the day Cañibano et al., 2008).

Relational Capital is the value of an organization’s relationship with the entities with which is interacts, being from this relationship that capital is transformed into monetary means (Stewart, 1997), that is, it is the knowledge incorporated in the relationships with stakeholders (Cabrita and Vaz, 2006 and 2008). Satisfaction, the relationships’ longevity, loyalty and trust are attributes of the relations with third parties and form a knowledge base and a means of accessing numerous resources (Cabrita, 2009).

Stewart (1997) refers that intellectual capital is not created from discreet groups of human, structural, and client capital, but rather from the interaction that exists between them. There is therefor, a consensus that none of these components are of value on their own, and that the creation and the feeding of value is made through the efficient interaction between the three dimensions of intellectual capital (Cabrita and Bontis, 2008), classifying intellectual capital as a multi-dimensional concept.

 

2.2.     Intellectual capital and the banking sector: a brief exposition

Intellectual capital’s influence upon the way the banking sector operates has not been adequately studied on a worldwide level, especially on what refers to the way in which organizations from this sector disclose information about the resources that give them their most competitive advantages.

The banking sector has undergone dramatic changes in the last few years through new strategies, new business models and forms of organizations. The many mergers and acquisitions that affect the sector also represent a constant challenge for the banking regulation organisms (Mention, 2011). These advances have forced banks to re-think their roles as financial intermediaries (Walter, 2009).

In this context, banks must have a proactive and innovative management in the development of new financial products and services, that is, a continuous application of knowledge as a valuable resource in this sector’s organizations. The truth of the matter is that bank activities involve close interactions with clients and depend largely on the integration of information and communication technologies for the development of new products and services, as well as for the automation of processes (Cabrita and Bontis, 2008 and Mention, 2011). While physical capital is essential for banks to operate, it is intellectual capital that determines the quality of the products and services supplied to its clients (Goh, 2005; Kamath, 2007; Wang et al., 2011).

This is also a sector that is highly regulated, due to the complexity of the operations, the great public interest and the need to protect the users and the financial system in general, thus requiring more transparency and trustworthiness. Furthermore, it has a great inference on the economy and much potential for social impact since it influences a large number of stakeholders (Chen and Pan, 2011).  

3.        Study Design

The model upon which we defined the parameters to analyse in order to evaluate the disclosure of intellectual capital was constructed with basis on the following two models: Intellectus, developed by the Centro de Investigación sobre la Sociedad del Conocimiento – Instituto de Administración de Empresas de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (CIC-IADE), and InCaS (made in Europe), which were adapted and applied for the very first time to the subject matter of  voluntary disclosure of  information on intellectual capital in the banking sector in Portugal (Silva et al., 2011).

As Cabrita (2009) refers, the study model to be applied should be chosen taking into account the comprehension of the elements and the context in which the organization operates, that is, the indicators used for analysis in an organization or sector are not necessarily the ones that are suitable for other organizations (sectors), therefor those indicators should be as specific or particular as possible for evaluating the knowledge that is crucial for delivering each organization’s strategy. Based upon this premise, and due to the particularity of the financial sector, we believe that this index is the best support on which to underpin our research. We find that the detail and depth that result from the structuring presented by the Intellectus model in identifying the components of intellectual capital to be important, as well as the existence of studies carried out by the Intellectus working group on the application of this model to various Spanish financial entities for measuring intellectual capital. Equally, the recent applicability of the InCaS model to the organizational reality on a European level has added valuable contributions to our investigation, which aims to add to the literature about the existence of a rigorous and standardized report of intellectual capital for banks.

 

3.1.     Construction of the indicators of disclosure of intellectual capital

Given the scope of the concept of intellectual capital, a generic analysis of the information disclosed may reveal to be of arguable usefulness. Therefore, more in-depth and detailed research is necessary by taking into account each of the components that make up the generic concept of intellectual capital. It is pressing to analyse the disclosure of human capital, structural capital and relational capital, all of which aggregate elements and indicators of disclosure that we consider to be the most significant in banking sector, hoping to help encourage their disclosure by these entities.

Therefore, and given the small dimension of the banking industry in Portugal and Spain, we have identified the universe of these entities, and we propose to analyse their practices of disclosure of intellectual capital such as Firer and Williams (2005), Striukova et al. (2008), Sousa (2009), Lee (2010) and Mention (2011), focusing our study (as Cabrita et al., 2017) entirely on online disclosure and on the Iberian banking sector.

 

HC Elements (3)

Variables (6)

Disclosure Indicators (21)

HC1 – Professional skills

CH 1.1 – Qualified employees

HC1.1.1 – Number of employees in each professional category

HC1.1.2 – Number of employees per schooling

HC1.1.3 – Number of qualified employees per level of salary

HC1.2 – Continuous training

HC1.2.1 – Number of hours of training

HC1.2.2 – Themes of training

HC1.2.3 – Number of employees in training

HC1.3 – Contract

HC1.3.1 – Number of admissions per competencies

HC1.3.2 – Number of employees with working contracts

HC1.3.3 – Number of employees working part-time

HC1.3.4 – Number of employees in apprenticeship

HC2 – Social competencies

HC2.1 – Social/cultural activities

HC2.1.1 – Internal social/cultural activities

HC2.1.2 – Social/cultural activities involving the civil community 

HC3 – Motivation

HC3.1 – Promotions and incentives

HC3.1.1 – Number of employees promoted on a regional, national and international level

HC3.1.2 – Benefits and bonuses given to the employees

HC3.1.3 – Incentive plans to attract and keep talent

HC3.1.4 – Payment plans of variable salaries

HC3.1.5 – Plans for employee satisfaction (motivation questionnaires

HC3.2 – Stability

HC3.2.1 – Rotation rate

HC3.2.2 – Absenteeism rate

HC3.2.3 – Average age of employees

HC3.2.4 – Identification of employees by average age

Table 1. Elements, variables and human capital indicators

 

Benefitting from the contributions of the mentioned models, the elements that make up these entities’ human capital (HC) provide orientations about their professional skills (HC1), social competencies (HC2), and motivation (HC3), as defined in table 1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Organizational Capital

SC Elements (3)

Variables (9)

Disclosure Indicators (24)

SC1 – Corporate Culture

SC1.1 –

Mission and Strategic Objectives

SC1.1.1 – Disclosure of mission and strategic objectives

SC1.1.2 – Description of the functional structure of the organization

SC1.1.3 – Processes of existing best practices

SC1.1.4 – Existence of codes of conduct, declarations of principles or of mission

SC1.2 – Operational Objectives

SC1.2.1 – Definition of management by objectives systems

SC1.2.2 – Existence of evaluation of performance systems

SC1.2.3 – Information about the indicators of performance

SC1.3 – Investigation and Development

SC1.3.1 – Expenses with Investigation and Development

SC1.3.2 – Existing projects of Investigation and development

SC1.4 – Recognition

SC1.4.1 – Description of the context of the bonuses received and formal recognitions

SC1.4.2 – Market share

SC2 – Internal Cooperation and transference of knowledge

SC2.1 – Team work and cooperation between departments

SC2.1.1 – Number of projects that were realized in teams

SC2.1.2 – Programs and rate of internal mobility and working flexibility

SC2.1.3 – Plans of management of competencies and development of leadership

SC2.2 – Sharing of Tacit Knowledge

SC2.2.1 – Informal Activities of sharing of knowledge

SC2.2.2 – Programs and rate of internal mobility and working flexibility

Technological Capital

SC3 – Technologies of the information and explicit knowledge

 

SC3.1 – Internal systems of communication and control

SC3.1.1 – Existing internal communication channels

SC3.1.2 – Existing external communication channels

SC3.1.3 – Systems of auditing and internal control

SC3.2 – Protocols and partnerships with other organisms

SC3.2.1 – Existing technologies of the information and communication

SC3.2.2 – Information and communication technologies to be applied or in development

SC3.3 – Quality evaluation

SC3.3.1 – Certificates obtained

SC3.3.2 – Methodologies and results of internal evaluation of the quality of the products/services

SC3.3.3 – Results of the external evaluation of the quality of the products/services

Table 2. Elements, variables and structural capital indicators

 

In the same manner, the structural capital (SC) elements that are considered adequate for identifying the factors related to the organizational structure and the bank entities processes are them cooperate culture (SC1); the internal cooperation and transference of knowledge (SC2) and its technologies of information and explicit knowledge (SC3), as shown on table 2.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Business Capital

RC Elements (3)

Variables (8)

Disclosure Indicators (21)

RC1 – Customer relations

RC1.1 –

Accessibility and client support

RC1.1.1 – Number of branches/agencies and their localization

RC1.1.2 – Online customer service channels

RC1.1.3 – Other communication and customer service channels

RC1.1.4 – Products/Services solutions for clients

RC1.2 – Group relations

RC1.2.1 – Countries where the Group operates

RC1.2.2 –Products supplied by the groups´ companies

RC1.2.3 – Strategic Alliances of the Group

RC1.3 – Client Satisfaction

RC1.3.1 – Number of Clients

RC1.3.2 – Information regarding systems for handling suggestions and complaints 

RC1.3.3 – Client satisfaction measuring processes

RC2 – Relations with investors

RC2.1 – Future oriented information

RC 2.1.1 – Information about company growth

RC 2.1.2 – Information about future projects

RC2.2 – Importance of the Investor

RC2.2.1 – Information about Investor support networks

RC2.2.2 – Information about the relationship with the investor

Society Capital

RC3 – Relations with other stakeholders

RC3.1 – Actions in social and environmental fields

RC3.1.1 – Identification of the organizations and the form of relationship

RC3.1.2 – Social responsibility activities and human rights protection

RC3.1.3 – Commitments regarding good environmental and energetic practice

RC3.2 – Protocols and partnerships with other organisms

RC3.2.1 – Description of organisms with whom partnerships are maintained

RC3.2.2 – Form of partnership developed or to be developed

RC3.3 – Other stakeholders

RC3.3.1 – Identification of the stakeholders

RC3.3.2 – Forms of communication and relationships

Table 3. Elements, variables and relational capital indicators.

 

 

Relational Capital (RC) elements seek to represent the variety of relations established; the relations with clients (CR1); the relations with investors (CR2), and the relations with stakeholders (CR3), as presented in table 3.

 

4.        Disclosure theories, methodological proceedures, sample and research issues

The requirement for transparency and reliability of banking sector organizations is reflected in a greater need of information, not only as a reflection of the larger demand of such information by the agents that are interested in it, and of its bigger usefulness towards decision-making, but also the organisations’ need to maintain or increase their legitimacy in the society(ies) in which they operate. In this manner, the foundations of the stakeholder (Freeman, 1994 and Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and legitimacy (Suchman, 1995 and Deegan, 2002) theories greatly influence these entities’ disclosure of information.

In this paper, we have adopted a positivist approach applying quantitative methods and using the content analysis technique on banks’ webpages in order to analyse and process data with proper statistical tools. This text coding technique allows us to determine the meaning of the content of the information in a “systematic”, “objective”, “reliable” and “reproducible” manner (Krippendorff, 1990), to obtain valid and replicable inferences (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006).

The coding of the content to be analysed was based on a specific index of disclosure, made up of sixty-six disclosure indicators, where we used a mechanistic approach of content analysis by applying a dichotomous criterion in an expressive categorization: defining 1 as the existence of information about the indicator being analysed; defining 0 as the non- existence of information contained in that indicator (Bardin, 1996). The disclosure index is represented in the equation below.

 

Intellectual Capital Index = ∑ disclosure items (1) / 66

1

Figure 1. Intellectual Capital Index

 

An empirical analysis was carried out through descriptive statistics of the variable being explained (disclosure of information on intellectual capital), as well as average comparison tests to comparatively analyse intellectual capital’s elements.

In order to carry out this work, we identified a total of eighty-six banks that in August of 2016 were listed in the Bank of Portugal and in the Bank of Spain, and that at that date had active and autonomous webpages available in each of those countries’ languages, which we present in table 4.

 

Banks operating in Portugal

1 – Novo Banco, SA

15 – BANIF – Banco de Investimento, SA

2 – Banco BAI Europa, SA

16 – Banco Português de Gestão, SA

3 – Banco BPI, SA

17 – BEST – Banco Electrónico de Serviço Total, SA

4 – Banco Invest, SA

18 – Banco Cofidis SA

5 – Banco Santander Totta, SA

19 – Banco Santander Consumer Portugal, SA

6 – Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Portugal), SA

20 – Banco BIC Português, SA

7 – Banco Ativo Bank, SA

21 – Banco EFISA, SA

8 – Caixa-Banco de Investimento, SA

22 – Novo Banco dos Açores, SA

9 – Banco Comercial Português SA

23 – Banco Privado do Atlântico – Europa, SA

10 – Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA

24 – BNI – Banco de Negócios Internacional (Europa), SA

11 – Banco Popular Portugal SA

25 – Banco CTT, SA

12 – Haitong Bank, SA

26 – Banco LJ Carregosa, SA

13 – Banco Finantia SA

27 – Banco Primus SA

14 – Banco de Investimento Global SA

28 – Banco Credibom, SA

Banks operating in Espanha

29 – Abanca Corporación Bancaria, SA

58 – Bankia, SA

30 – A&G – Banca Privada, SA

59 – Bankinter, SA

31 – Allfunds Bank, SA

60 – Bankoa, SA

32 – AndBank España, SA

61 – Banque Marrocain du Commerce Exterieur International, SA

33 – AresBank, SA

62 – BNP Paribas España, SA

34 – Banca March, SA

63 – CaixaBank, SA

35 – Banca Pueyo, SA

64 – Cajasur Banco, SA

36 – Banco Alcala, SA

65 – Catalunya Banc, SA

37 – Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA

66 – CecaBank, SA

38 – Banco Caixa Geral, SA

67 – Citibank España, SA

39 – Banco Caminos, SA

68 – Deutsche Bank, Sociedad Anonima Española

40 – Banvo Cetelem, SA

69 – Dexia Sabadell, SA

41 – Banco Cooperativo Español, SA

70 – EBN Banco de Negocios, SA

42 – Banco de caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, SA

71 – Evo Banco, SA

43 – Banco de Castilla-La-Mancha, SA

72 – Ibercaja Banco, SA

44 – Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, SA

73 – KutxaBank, SA

45 – Banco de Sabadell, SA

74 – LiberBank, SA

46 – Banco Europeo de Finanzas, SA

75 – Nuevo Micro Bank, SA

47 – Banco Finantia Sofinloc, SA

76 – Nuevo Micro Bank, SA

48 – Banco Inversis, SA

77 – Popular Banca Privada, SA

49 – Banco Mare Nostrum, SA

78 – RBC Investor Services España, SA

50 – Banco Mediolanum, SA

79 – Renta 4 Banco, SA

51 – Banco Occidental, SA

80 – Santander Consumer Finance, SA

52 – Banco Pastor, SA

81 – Santander Securities Services, SA

53 – Banco Pichincha España, SA

82 – Self Trade Bank, SA

54 – Banco Popular Español, SA

83 – TargoBank, SA

55 – Banco Santander, SA

84 – Unicaja Banco, SA

56 – Bancofar, SA

85 – Unoe Bank, SA

57 – Bank Degroof Petercam Spain, SA

86 – Wizink Bank, SA

Table 4. Banks studied

 

 

Since it is possible to alter the information contained in webpages, these were analysed only once in the month of August of 2016, because we consider that it is the month containing more stable online information, since it is in that month that most vacation time is taken. In this analysis, we only considered the information contained in the navigator format, not taking into consideration the information contained in documents included in the webpages (such as word, pdf, power point, etc.) (Striukova et al., 2008).

The research issues that we propose to analyse are:

1st– What is the extent or magnitude of the disclosure of intellectual capital that the banks operating in the Iberian Peninsula present in their webpages and;

2nd-What is the disclosure of each of the components into which we subdivided intellectual capital (human capital, structural capital and relational capital), revealed by these entities.

The extent of the disclosure of information about intellectual capital will be analysed through the disclosure of each of intellectual capital’s components (human capital, structural capital and relational capital), and through the general level of the disclosure of intellectual capital (Guthrie et al., 2006).

5.        Presentation and analysis of results

In order to respond to the research issues that we presented, we began by analysing the average of disclosure of intellectual capital revealed through the internet by the Iberian banks. However, the analysis of the disclosure of intellectual capital considered in an aggregated form may not respond to the rigour and usefulness aimed for in the studies on this subject, namely, to the demands of the various stakeholders. Therefore, and like most of the research carried out in this field, we consider that it is acute to separately analyse the disclosure of intellectual capital’s components or categories (human capital, structural capital and relational capital).

 

 

 

N

Average

Minimum

Maximum

Standard deviation

Intellectual Capital

86

0.2355

0.0734

0.6032

0.1038

Human Capital

86

0.0493

0.0000

0.2857

0.0634

Sctructural Capital

86

0.2044

0.0417

0.6667

0.1117

Relational Capital

86

0.4529

0.0952

1.0000

0.1885

Table 5. Disclosure of intellectual capital

 

 

An analysis of the results shown on table 5 allows us to verify that the average of disclosure of information about intellectual capital in the Iberian banks’ webpages is 0.2355, with a standard deviation (SD) of 0.1038, showing great variability of the values in relation to the average. Relational Capital presents the largest average of disclosure (with a value of 0.4529), followed by structural capital with an average value of 0.2044 and human capital with an average of disclosure of 0.0493.

 

 

N

Average

Minimum

Maximum

Standard deviation

HC1 – Professional skills

86

0.0362

0.0000

0.2222

0.0576

HC2 – Social competencies

86

0.0581

0.0000

0.0581

0.2089

HC3 – Motivation

86

0.0613

0.0000

0.0613

0.0930

SC1 – Corporate Culture

86

0.2209

0.0000

0.6667

0.1226

SC2 – Internal Cooperation and transference of knowledge

86

0.0203

0.0000

0.8333

0.1171

SC3 – Technologies of the information and explicit knowledge

86

0.2151

0.0000

0.8333

0.1680

RC1- Customer relations

86

0.5707

0.0000

1.0000

0.1840

RC2 – Relations with investors

86

0.1977

0.0000

1.0000

0.2742

RC3 – Relations with other stakeholders

86

0.3785

0.0000

1.0000

0.3085

Table 6. Comparison of the average of disclosure of the intellectual capital elements

 

With regards to the elements that make up intellectual capital, we verify that information about relations with clients (RC1) has the highest average value of disclosure (value of 0.5707), followed by the information about the relations with other stakeholders (RC3), with an average of 0.3785. The thirst most disclosed element is corporate culture (SC1) with an average value of 0.2209, followed by information about technologies of the information and explicit knowledge (SC3), with an average value of 0.2151.

In order to analyse the disclosure of each of intellectual capital’s components in the webpages made by Iberian banks, we have also compared the average of disclosure between each of these components, through the statistical significance of the t-student test.

 

 

N

Average

Standard deviation

Average of the difference

t

sig

HC – SC

86

-0.1552

0.1003

0.0108

-14.351

0.000

SC – RC

86

-0.2485

0.1425

0.0154

-16.166

0.000

HC – RC

86

-0.4086

0.1695

0.0183

-22.079

0.000

Table 7. Comparason of the average of disclosure of intelectual capital’s components

 

As we can verify from table 7, the values show statistical evidence confirming that there is greater disclosure of information about relational capital on the Iberian bank’s webpages than disclosure of information about human capital and about structural capital, followed by the disclosure of information about structural capital and the information about human capital.

Thus, webpages prove to be a preferential means of disclosure of information of commercial nature and of marketing, associated with the relations between customers and investors, as well as the relations with other stakeholders, however this means of communication is not the one that banks consider to be very important for disclosing their technological resources (structural capital). Clearly human resources present a derisory disclosure through this means of communication of information, generically identified as “taboo information”. The result presented in the disclosure of this component in the internet can be explained by three general reasons (Silva, 2012): this means of disclosure is associated to be being vulnerable and easily manipulated; the non-relevance of this information for the main users of webpages (mainly clients); and the scarce acknowledgment amongst the organizations of the importance given to human resources as a source of strategic value for those entities. The third reason does not seem to us to be the most probable, as an example let’s look at the results obtained in the studies by Antunes (2005 and 2006) and Antunes and Martins (2007), that aim to analyse managers’ perception of the concept of intellectual capital and its relationship with the performance of the organizations, showing that these associate intellectual capital to human capital, primarily investing in this component.

Thus, confirming that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the quantity of information disclosed in each of intellectual capital’s components in the Iberian banks’ webpages. The results reveal a strategy to disclose, through the webpages, certain information that is more specific and directed at the main users of this means of information (essentially clients and the general public) (Gandía, 2002 and 2003; Branco et al., 2011).

In view of the above, we consider that the banks operating in the Iberian Peninsula show a strong preference towards the use of webpages as a channel of disclosure of relational capital, this being the information that meets the demands of the main stakeholders that use this channel of information.

6.        Conclusion

The banking sector holds great intensity in intellectual capital, which reveals to be the most visible to a large number of stakeholders considering the importance of its’ activity upon the general economy. This is also the sector that should invest more intensely in the disclosure of its’ intellectual capital, using the most advanced information and communications technologies. Webpages are a privileged means for disclosing the management of organizational knowledge and they acquire great acuity in the field of disclosure of intellectual capital. Given this situation, and in light of the stakeholders and the legitimacy theories, in this study we proposed to analyse the disclosure practices on the webpages in August of 2016 of intellectual capital made by banks operating in Portugal and Spain.

By applying an index built specifically for the disclosure of intellectual capital of banking sector organizations, we aimed to analyse the extent and breadth of the online disclosure of intellectual capital and of each of its components, human capital, structural capital and relational capital, by Iberian banks.

The study revealed an average of disclosure of intellectual capital on webpages of 0.2355. As for the components that make up intellectual capital, the disclosure made by banks in Portugal and Spain of relational capital is higher than the disclosure of structural capital and of human capital. We can see that the results obtained reveal that there is an information management strategy made in accordance with the demands of its stakeholders, and webpages prove to be mainly suited for the disclosure of information for clients.

Intellectual Capital’s influence upon the operation of the banking sector has been little-studied on a worldwide level, especially in what regards to the way in which this sector’s organizations disclose information about the resources that give them their most competitive advantages. This factor was fundamental for carrying out this study, which hopes to contribute towards attributing more relevance to the disclosure of the main strategic resources of XXI century organizations.

 

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[FULL] Article 4, Volume 4 Issue 2

Virtues of integrity and veracity in reporting, data alone is not enough. A case study approach

Author

Natàlia Cugueró-Escofet

Núria Villaescusa Serrano

Abstract

One of the claims made in reporting is that firms should publish more information, both quantitative and qualitative. The annual reports of companies are thought precisely to fulfill this function: allowing the ones who have any type of interest in companies to be aware of the data, both quantitative and qualitative (in the form of annual reports). In this paper, we argue that data alone is not enough. We use the case of the company Fish&Fish, Inc. to show that the problem goes beyond the data itself. The most well calculated data and the most detailed reports could be insufficient to deter future ethical misbehaviors or to perform ethical behavior for the stakeholders. We argue that data must be complemented with several ethical virtues: integrity on the managerial part, veracity in the way reports are written. These two should also be complemented with justice, meaning that balancing several interests that parties have at the same time and managing the way integrity and veracity needs to be implemented in reporting decisions. Looking at Fish&Fish, Inc. we show that the main problems was the lack of veracity and integrity in the reporting that may mask present or future fraud.

Keywords

1.        Introduction

The quality of accounting information and Financial reporting is especially relevant because of the consequences that can be derived from low quality financial statements. Often, the only indicator that external agents have about the performance of a company are their financial statements. A high degree of quality in financial reports is highly valued by markets because it reduces information asymmetries, increase transparency and offer a better system for contractual objectives (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). This aspect is particularly relevant in listed companies, since low quality accounting information causes, for example, delays in the adjustment of stock prices (Callen et al. 2013).

Objectives of reporting are different. There are cases in that fraud comes evident, but reports try to hide it, and auditing procedures and practices are not designed to detect accounting fraud. Trying to incorporate more quantitative information can be seen as a partial solution, the same as the claim for adding more qualitative information but this is not the cause of problematic reporting to deter potential future fraud. Even the more detailed information and the fact of adding qualitative data is not solving the potential problem of fraud, as it can be seen in the case we present here.

Reports must be aligned with managerial integrity, which means that they should  be promising future events and results that are seen as possible or not blatantly impossible to be achieved by the managers responsible of achieving them. There also two aspects of integrity, the positive part, meaning that promising possible future results, and the negative part, which means not promising what is not achievable.

Moreover, reports need to create veracity, which means have a content that is creating the right perceptions for the parties with interests at stake. Veracity also implies not promoting wrong perceptions. Both aspects of veracity are regarding the content and the decision of how to write when reporting.

Integrity and veracity are important so the lack of the two would mean companies are trying not to keep their promises and communicate it in a way that misleads the perceptions of the interested parties.

The most well calculated data and the most detailed reports could be insufficient to deter future ethical misbehaviors or to be ethical to the stakeholders. Data is not neutral, as it implies decisions and choices of which data to include and the way it should be included. Managers should make decisions about which information to include, which to be set out, and how it must be written and included. Criteria to guide these decisions is crucial and we argue that should be guided by the ethical virtues of integrity and veracity. Therefore, data should be complemented with ethical virtues. These two, in reporting are considered relevant, as the information and the way it is presented create perceptions of the company in the eyes of the stakeholders. These perceptions are not neutral and may manipulate them to act in the future against their best interest, for instance not making a decision that may improve their own results or prevent them for a big loss (e.g. taking too much risk).

The idea of ethical virtues is not new for management control systems, in which reporting is embedded as a system contained in the full Management Control Systems (from now on MCS) set. Justice is  a virtue that has been considered fundamental, both, in the management control formal system and in the way the system is used (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2013). Some research has shown that informal justice is even more important that the formal one. The main reason behind is that informal justice can create influence over formal justice, as a manager, if decides guided by justice can change the systems that are formally unjust and improves them to transform into more just ones (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2015b, Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2015a). In reporting, it seems also relevant to consider that the informal justice, can guide also the formal justice of reporting, and can therefore improve other virtues that are also relevant, which are integrity and veracity.

We proceed to look first into the concepts of integrity/lack of integrity and veracity/lack of veracity, as critical values in MCS and specifically in reporting. Afterwards we introduce the Fish&Fish case, first exposing the key aspects of the company and the reports and afterwards looking into them to see instances of lack of integrity and veracity in the reports and information that contained. We explain how reverting the situations of lack of veracity and integrity would be more important to deter fraud rather than incorporating more information, both qualitative and quantitative, and we incorporate a concept of informal justice as guiding reporting decisions. We finally draw some conclusions and propose future aspects that can be studied in the future.

2.        Ethical virtues in reporting. The specific case of integrity and veracity.

Integrity and veracity are managerial virtues that need to be integrated as part of the decision-making processes in organizations. Both are also affecting the reports that a company write in order to communicate main data informing about actual company’s performance and those plans that may also affect how the company is likely to perform in the future. Reporting is a way companies have to increase the awareness of how the organization is performing as well as the consequences of not achieving the results expected for the parties that have interests at stake. At the same time, reports may help to explain possible plans of the company and the expectations about these plans, and how likely are them to be successful.

We start with integrity and by looking at research in several areas of knowledge, it is clear that integrity is a very wide and multifaceted concept that has been studied from many perspectives, many of them related to ethics and virtues, from perspectives of normative and positive scientific approaches, coming from the fields of psychology, management, politics, law and sociology.

Some psychologists consider integrity from the perspective of how likely it is that it may help someone to overcome negative aspects of life, and how it could be possible to reinforce it as a positive personality trait that may offer a positive guidance of behavior (Killinger 2010). From Killinger’s perspective, integrity would need to incorporate compassion, and it is necessary to include motivated behavior, meaning that doing the right thing but also for the right reason.

Integrity can also be studied from the government, politics or management perspective and then, it can be seen differently depending on the approach taken. Looking at integrity as a virtue, some researchers consider it close to other virtues like humility and accountability (Kaptein 2014). Following Kaptein, managers should become a role model to be followed by the rest of the organization, being integrity one of the main aspects that constitute managerial role (Kaptein 2014), that can be considered as managing by example, so creating a role that people follow and believe. Kaptein and Wempe extend the concept of integrity to the organization as a whole, and consider integrity a requirement to create a balanced corporation (Kaptein and Wempe 2002).

Going back to Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, integrity as a virtue is concerned with honor and it is represented with the concepts of proper pride and greatness of soul, also can be considered close to magnanimity. Depending on the translation, we can find different words to represent this virtue. Pride is found in the translation of David Ross, but in the comments of Lesley Brown, she considers that the appropriate translation for pride would be “proper pride”. Following this, “pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character” (Aristotle 2009: Book IV, Chapter III). In another edition of the Nicomachean Ethics this virtue is translated as greatness of soul; a great-souled man “is an extreme in terms of greatness, but he is in the middle in terms of his acting as one ought, since he deems himself worthy of what accords with his worth, whereas the others exceed or are deficient” (Aristotle 2011: Book IV, Chapter III).

In management, integrity has been studied from several perspectives and in several fields. Some of them stress more the concept of ethics and others try to see integrity as a more positive concept more according to facts than to values.

In organizational behavior, integrity is a constituent of trustworthiness. In a seminal paper trustworthiness is considered a key concept that incorporates integrity as one of its constituents, jointly with ability and benevolence (Mayer et al. 1995). Mayer et al. consider that a manager is perceived as trustworthy from the perspective of the others managed by him or her if he or she shows ability, integrity and benevolence. Then the importance of integrity is because it generates trust, being trust one of the most important aspects that affect many other organizational variables in organizations that are also generating performance. Integrity from Mayer et al. perspective is a concept that concerns ethics, as it is the perception that the manager adheres to a set of principles that managed agree are worth. Therefore, managerial integrity from this point of view is concerned with the ethical background of the manager and his or her job.

Studied from the perspective of agency theory, integrity is seen as a requirement or sufficient condition to create performance (Werner et al. 2010). Werner, Jensen and Zaffron consider that the main trouble with agency theory is that people does not understand integrity and they cheat.

They consider that integrity exists in a positive realm and that it is not necessary to consider integrity as good or bad, or right or wrong, this precisely makes integrity less workable and not useful to understand the scientific role that it has over performance. They consider that the main problem is the “lack of scientific understanding of the impact of integrity on performance and the absence of research quantifying it as a product of the “veil of invisibility” that obscures the relationship between integrity and performance. This veil of invisibility results in what we call the Integrity-Performance Paradox: People and organizations, while committed to performance, systematically sacrifices integrity in the name of increasing performance and thereby, reduce performance” (Werner et al. 2010: p.78).

Werner et al. consider that the reason of cheating is because people think that integrity does not pay off in terms of performance, so that, being considered an ethical concept, managers think that behaving with integrity may cost money to them, and therefore this would made them worse performers. This meaning that, “in summary, when the name of the game is performance, and integrity is seen as a virtue rather than a necessary condition for performance, people and organizations will thus paradoxically be willing to sacrifice integrity in the name of performance” (Werner et al. 2010: p.79). They define several factors that according to them constitute the veil of invisibility, the first one being the one we have already commented: seen integrity as a virtue. They define integrity as keeping one’s word and they consider that “without integrity nothing works” (Werner et al. 2010: p.87), and that this sentence is an heuristic that ensures the opportunity for maximum performance, as integrity generates workability that in turn generates performance. They define this in negative terms, meaning that a lack of integrity creates some degree of non-workability for the whole organization or the party involved, even if from the point of view of this party he or she receives some reward for this behavior. Therefore, the costs (or degrees of non-workability) are somehow hidden in organizations and affect the long term.

This model of integrity poses a very interesting aspect that ethicists have already exposed. The problem is not that integrity is seen as a virtue, and therefore, the mainstream economics suggest it would be bad in case we aim at performing better; the problem is that there is a difference between the short and the long term. In many cases, companies are unethical and make the wrong decisions, because in the short term these imply good consequences and benefit some parties, even if at a high cost in the long term for the same parties or the rest of the stakeholders. Examples of unethical behavior that can have consequences in the long term are many. Take the case of some incentive systems that pair performance and incentives, and create unethical behaviors in the short term. Why? Because people pursue short term results, which are generating bad consequences in the long term in terms of future results, but also because they put the whole company at stake by entering in a spiral of additional unethical behaviors that have bad consequences in terms of long term results as well (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2016).

In our case we try to examine integrity in reporting. We are interested in looking at the lack of integrity or broken integrity, defined in terms of the word that in the studied case we find evident that is not possible to be kept. Also, integrity as hiding the impossibility of keeping the word, on purpose (which would be also related to veracity, that is examined next). We think that undermining integrity is the reason behind the fraud in the case, and the worsening of the company performance, amongst other consequences.

The second aspect or condition we are interested to examine is veracity. Veracity means giving the necessary information to generate the appropriate perceptions on the other parties and not inducing error that can allow the other parties to make mistakes and make decision that go against them (Pérez López 2014). Veracity is close to the concepts of being accurate, truthful and honest. Following the definition from the Cambridge Dictionary, veracity is the “quality of being true, honest, or accurate”. Other definitions consider veracity close to the concept of ‘facts’, which would also mean being accurate and close to the real situation.

Pérez López focus on motivations and considers that the aim a manager has when making any decision is important. This can apply to information and communication decisions. Following his argument, managers need to be aware that communicating has effects so that the content and the way this communication is done generates right perceptions, which may lead to right consequences or misleading perceptions that would generate wrong consequences. Therefore, managers should create veracity to promote the right perceptions and consequences and to avoid as much as possible the wrong counterparts. Veracity goes beyond truth, as it implies selecting how to communicate the truth and which information is relevant regarding this truth. So it means being true, close to facts as much as possible, by incorporating accurate information and being honest when disclosing the information. How this applies to reporting? In reporting is crucial incorporating veracity as a criteria. There is too much information to communicate in a real organization, therefore selecting the right one is basic not to overwhelm people with too much information that may distract them from understanding how the company really performs. But on the other side, if the report lacks of relevant information would also lead to wrong perceptions of how the company actually performs. The right equilibrium between being true, selecting the necessary information, and also choosing how to communicate it and use it, which includes being honest, is what constitutes the veracity criterion.

3.        Case of the Company Fish&Fish, Inc.

One of the critical issues in accounting research and practice is the capability of generate relevant and reliable information in respect to a certain problem. However, for the research to be relevant, no matter the method used, it must have a better understanding of reality as the main objective (Power and Gendron 2015). We are choosing a case study approach because it is important to see specific cases that allow us to understand how our two criteria (integrity and veracity) is shown in real reports, and see whether our hypotheses that the problem is lack of veracity and integrity fit in the data collected in this case. Case study approach has been claimed as having a great potential in accounting to generate additional insights from the real practice; a general advice of incorporating this method has been made recently in accounting literature.

Apart from the general claim of using cases, there is an additional reason to choose this specific case. This particular case would allow us to study the qualitative data included in the annual report in a case in which it is known that earnings manipulations has occurred and try to go back and see if our hypothesized causes are possible there.

We also think that studying this particular case would help to set a model that in the future can be used in other cases, and finally constitute a possible theory to be studied and examined empirically using other methods, challenging our arguments here and presenting other possibilities that would enhance our knowledge of fraud and how to increase fraud deterrence. 

3.1.     Background of the case of Fish&Fish, Inc.

The company selected is an international company totally integrated vertically in the fishery industry. Fish&Fish was accused of accounting fraud in 2013, because of data released in the 2012 annual report. The company was initially a family owned company that went public in 1970, but the founding family was still one of the major shareholders at the time the fraud was discovered.

The forensic report found out that the company had overstated its revenues as well as understated its debt. The fraud detected was committed through other companies outside the consolidation perimeter but controlled by the fraudster company.  The fraud basically consisted in selling fictitious inventories and increasing debt through these controlled non-consolidated companies. The forensic auditors stated that they had analyzed the financial statements until two years before the fraud was discovered even if they suspected that the company had been manipulating its accounts far before.

3.2.     Data collection

All data has been obtained from public sources, as the annual report is generally available at the CNMV, like the corporate governance reports and the forensic audit report.

Non-financial measures available from public sources have been proved to be effective when assessing fraud risk (Brazel et al. 2009). Sometimes analysts and investors do not pay much attention to the quantitative and qualitative information implicitly included in the financial report. Such information, as can be the case of capacity, is usually correlated with financial measures such as revenues growth, that can be inflicted from the information provided and tested for consistency.

In the example analyzed, Fish&Fish has two primarily sources of raw material (which is fish in this case): fishing and aquaculture. If we consider the first source, we might think that a good measure of the capacity of the company could be the number of vessels they owned. The balance sheet of the company included non- current assets held for sale that they explained they were some vessels they wanted to sell and substitute by others more specialized. So, if this happened to be true, we could expect the number of vessels should remain stable or increase according to the sales growth. With the information of the balance sheet regarding non-current assets held for sale, the information included in the management report regarding capacity, and the sales reported in the Consolidated income statement of the company we could extract the following information:

Table 1. Capacity estimation of the company (number of vessels)

 

2007

2008

2009

2010

20111

      

Non current assets held for sale (Number of vessels)

5

12

8

6

5

Total fleet of the company

130

125

119

Not disclosed

Not disclosed

Amount assets held for sale

33,459

41,600

38,000

32,000

28,000

Fishing Tones disclosed in the management report

More than 120.000

More than 120.000

More than 120.000

More than 100.000

More than 100.000

Total fleet disclosed in the management report

Not disclosed             

Not disclosed

More than 100

Around 100

Not disclosed

Sales (in milions)

1,293

1,343

1,473

1,565

1,671

Increase in sales

 

+3.8%

+9.7%

+6.2%

+6.7%

Decrease in fleet

 

-3.8%

-4.8%

-15.9%

n/a

Source: Authors’ own work based on publicly available information

Table 1. Capacity estimation of the company (number of vessels)

 

3.3.     Evidence of lack of veracity and integrity

3.3.1.      Information about vessels

The first measure of capacity we could consider is the number of vessels. We can see that the number of vessels was decreasing until 2009. From 2010 and the following years they did not disclose this type of information anymore, even if but there were still non-current assets held for sale, where they stated the number of vessels included to be sold, but not the total fleet. To further explain this, in 2009, they say the non-current assets held for sale were 8 out of the 119 vessels of the company; in 2010 they just say the non-current assets held for sale were 6. In the same direction, in the management report, after disclosing this information for two years, they stop doing it from 2011 and the following years. 

So, it can be observed in reports that they change the way they report the vessels to create the wrong perceptions of the real situation. They change the way they disclose the information of total vessels, so distracting the interested parties from the real amount of vessels sold in a specific year, and also they did not report the total amount of vessels owned in a specific year. So they would stop the interested parties in knowing that the company is selling too many vessels or own the insufficient ones to operate in the terms they need to do to generate the results they say the generate. Both aspects go against the promises of performance (they are not following integrity criteria), and they also not follow veracity, as they are aiming at creating the wrong perceptions.

3.3.2.      Information about fish catch

A second measure of capacity would be the number of tones of fish catch. In this case we observe that the company always uses the words “more than” to disclose this information giving the sensation of growth, when it’s not the case as we see that in 2010 the tones were at least 20.000 Tn less than the previous year.

Now, considering the second source of fish for the company, aquaculture, we could consider the number of tones produced as a major indicator of capacity.

 

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

      

Total Inventories

426.634

501.920

499.213

578.608

676.805

Work in process

74.748

104.637

141.501

219.160

268.938

      

Biological Assets included in work in process

73.154

93.870

113.986

182.596

259.708

Aquaculture Production

65.000 Tn

65.000 Tn

67.000 Tn

65.000 Tn

Not disclosed

Source: Authors’ own work based on publicly available information

Table 2. Capacity estimation of the company (number of vessels)

 

The increase in work in process inventories, during these years corresponds almost entirely to biological assets. In these five years analyzed, these have gone from 73,154 thousand euros to 259,708 thousand. The biological assets correspond to three types of species, mainly turbot (in Spain and Portugal), salmon (in Chile), and shrimp (in Central America and tilapia in Brazil). The turbot has a long production cycle, which is between 600 and 800 days (20-26 months), from birth until it is considered suitable for commercialization, when it reaches a weight between 700 gr. and 2 Kg., although there may be specimens that reach 4 kg intended especially for restoration; salmon is also of long life cycle; shrimp and tilapia are short life cycle, between 3 and 5 months the first and between 6 and 9 the second.  It is to be expected, then, that the biological assets are composed mainly of the species with the longest life cycle, namely turbot and salmon.  In June 2009 a new plant of a long life cycle species breeding and fattening was set up. We should expect a considerable increase in biological assets starting this year, 2009, but not before, when the company reported that production in aquaculture had remained stable at 65,000 Tn.

While an increase in stocks of biological assets may make sense with the company’s strategy at the time they were planning to increase the proportion of aquaculture income relative to extractive fishing, the company did not offer any explanation for the excessive increase in these stocks, nor the detail of its composition by species or by geographical area.  Although this aspect is not indicative of any irregular practice, it does represent a sign of alarm and more when, especially when it is not accompanied by an increase in production in aquaculture as detailed in the consolidated management report, which should at least be mentioned.

However, it does seem appropriate to compare the stocks of biological assets with other similar companies in the sector, Marine Harvest and Cermaq, both with interests in salmonid aquaculture in Chile.

Both companies have a very similar evolution in terms of biological assets, with a very significant drop in these in 2009. In Fish&Fish, however, from 2009 the amount of their biological assets skyrockets to almost triple.  In 2008, there was an infection by the ISA virus in fish farms throughout the Atlantic area of ​​Chile. The annual report of Cermaq, one of the companies that we have used as benchmarking in the business structure, opened the 2008 financial report with a letter from the CEO entitled “A painful year”. The company explained that the main cause was that an infectious disease (Infectious Salmon Anaemia, ISA) that causes immense mortality and reduces the growth of salmon had affected all the aquaculture regions of Chile. As a consequence of the loss of growing salmon, the losses of its Chilean subsidiary amounted to 332 million Norwegian crowns (35 million euros), compared to a profit of 552 million two years ago. The company Marine Harvest reported in the annual report of the same year 2008 that due to losses that come from the ISA virus in Chile they have proceeded to endow an impairment for the entire goodwill value of the Chilean subsidiary, being the amount reported, 1,5 billion Swedish crowns (158 million euros), which in part had caused the group as a whole to have losses of SEK 2,852 million.  Fish&Fish, in the corresponding report for the same fiscal year 2008, in the section on biological assets (note 12 of the report) said: “No profit or loss has been generated for the initial recognition of biological assets, as well as for Changes in fair value less estimated costs at the point of sale “.

According to a news item published in Mercopress, on November 18, 2008, the virus was detected in one of the salmon farms belonging to Pesca Chile, one of Fish&Fish’s subsidiaries in Chile. According to this news, the company, although the tests had been positive but the fish showed no signs of the disease, had agreed to slaughter 300,000 baby salmon. 

We can conclude that there was a disproportionate increase in current product inventories due to the increase in biological assets mainly. For the life cycle of the biological assets available to the company, these should be mainly turbot and salmon. In both cases, there were exceptional situations that were not reported in the company’s report and that they would like to generate wrong perceptions from the parties with interests at stake; therefore, the veracity principle did not hold, as the accuracy in which the reports transmit the information lack of it. Additionally the reports are also creating suspects of future “non-integrity” as it is difficult to keep the promises made with the actual situation that the reports hide.

4.        Justice to inform objectives and control for their achievement. Informal justice to guide and enhance integrity and veracity.

As we mention in previous part, two of the main virtues that need to be include as guidance in reporting are integrity and veracity. But to arrive to a good balance of the two, and in general balancing other virtues, management has considered that objectives must be guided by another virtue that in governing organizations is crucial, which is justice.

MCS are used to achieve certain levels of goal congruence between the different parties that have interests at stake. Some research has studied the role of justice in achieving the greater possible goal congruence between parties, in the research the systems explained are incentive systems, but this can be extended to other MCS ; justice needs to be a requirement of the formal system and the informal use of it (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2013).

Justice has several facets, and these are labeled differently depending on the area of research. For instance in MCS justice of the system is called formal justice and justice from the point of view of the managerial use is labeled informal justice (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas 2013). In Organizational Justice there are four justice factors that explain the four aspects important to generate justice perceptions (Colquitt 2001). Distributive justice (concerning the output of the process and how to be seen as just the way it is shared amongst parties affected), procedural justice (the formal requirements of procedures to consider them leading to just outcomes), justice regarding the information displayed (informational justice) and the way the information is delivered to parties (interpersonal justice). Regarding reporting, one crucial aspect is the information included in the reports and the way this information is delivered, therefore informational justice needs to be a requirement of the process and the decisions involved as well as the informal justice regarding the use of the mechanisms and reports.

5.        Conclusions and managerial implications

Several conclusions can be drawn out of our case study. In reporting, some people has stressed the importance of incorporate more quantitative data in the reports (more “hard” information). Additionally, other researchers and practitioners have considered that the solution would be to incorporate qualitative aspects that go beyond the quantitative data.

Both recommendations are partially true. It may happen that the problem actually is lack of data, both quantitative and qualitative, but the reason for not including those data is not because they are not available but because managers are choosing not to include it, even if this means going against the veracity and integrity criteria. Therefore, asking for more data would not modify that managers could “cheat” on purpose. In contrast, we claim that there is a need to propose other aspects to be included that affect more the behavior of managers, and that would be making companies aware of the necessity to include veracity and integrity in managerial reporting. In fact, and this is true for other virtues, lack of virtue cannot be corrected adding more formalities or requirements in terms of data or new procedures alone. Lack of virtue can be corrected adding reasons for virtue inclusion, convincing companies that these virtues should be incorporated, and ways to do it so.

Looking at the Fish&Fish case we can easily arrive to the conclusion that the data are there, so we can easily reach the conclusion that is not the lack of data that originates the problem. In this respect, and reading the reports available, we can conclude that an important part of the problems is that reports may “mislead” the readers by conducing them to form the wrong perceptions of what is happening- Therefore reports may lack veracity and furthermore honesty, as managers avoid to inform of some important aspects on purpose. Apart from trying to generate equivocal perceptions, managers also omit to qualify the information presented. Thus, information about the firm’s plans and how likely it is that they are going to be achieved as planned is not presented.

We can conclude with this case that quantitative and qualitative data are important; but this may be a necessary condition to report correctly, but not sufficient. The most well calculated data and the most well and thoroughly explained reports need to incorporate two criteria: veracity and integrity. Both aspects rely on managerial decisions regarding which information to include in reports and how this information should be written, so how to qualify it.

Virtues in reporting are unavoidable. From agency theory perspective some authors have reached the conclusion that integrity is more a positive requirement that leads to performance but that the problem is that managers have considered it as a virtue, and therefore they choose not to be a person of integrity because they would be virtuous but not good performers. Hence, this approach considers that integrity as a virtue is problematic, but this is not the real problem. It is clear ethics and performance are not totally aligned, as in the short run one can be unethical and still have some (even big) level of performance. But the relevant aspect is to convince people that being a person of integrity may lead likely to a higher level of performance in the long term. This meaning that being ethical pays off because it is the right thing to do, and in the end, the most likely way to survive in the long term (so achieving an enough level of performance that may lead to sustainable and balanced (so fair or just) outcomes to all parties affected. In reporting using integrity means keeping promises, but also trying to compensate for those promises that have not been achieved but they should have been achieved.

Veracity is also necessary as “truth” is an important value in companies. But not naked truth, but a truth that should be communicated and comprehended in an adequate manner. And it is the quality of explaining the truth that is important and that consists of an ethical virtue that managers need to perform when reporting. This veracity does not mean adding more “true” data (in terms of adding numbers or explanations of them). Instead, veracity requires being honest, so, conforming to the true facts as much as possible but with the intention of accuracy, so generating the right perceptions and interpretations to those parties affected by the data. Then, reporting needs to calculate well, explain the data with the minimum necessary length, and also not missing any relevant information, and having the willingness to make people understand what is relevant and important for them. 

Second, the objectives of reporting, as is the case in general for any aspect of MCS, need to include justice. In the formal aspects (red lines agreed), but also in the informal parts, as it is the case of the decisions made when reporting and also after reading the reports. And finally, we want to stress the informal aspect of reporting, therefore the “use” of the reports as crucial and unavoidable, which implies deciding and being virtuous in doing so, using justice as a criterion in reporting and using reports and the data involved.

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Aristotle (2011). The Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Barlett, Robert C. and Collins, Susan D. The Chicago University Press.

 

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Cugueró-Escofet, N. & Rosanas, J. M. (2016). The Ethics of Metrics: Overcoming the Dysfunctional Effects of Performance Measurements Through Justice. Journal of Business Ethics, DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3049-2.

 

Kaptein, M. (2014). The Servant of the People: On the Power of Integrity in Politics and Government. Social Science Research Network. SSRN:2498730 

 

Kaptein, M. & Wempe, J. (2002). The Balanced Company: A theory of corporate integrity.

 

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Watts, R. & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive theory of accounting. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall.

 

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[FULL] Article 3, Volume 4 Issue 2

Management Control Systems before and after the Transition from a Communist to a Capitalist System: the case of Albania

Author

Josep M. Rosanas Martí

Enkelejda Ymeri

Abstract

For quite a while, in the second half of the 20th Century, Albania was considered the possibly most radical communist country, even beyond Mao’s China, and was an isolated country in Europe. Then, after the fall of the Berlin wall, it evolved towards some form of western capitalism, which is where it stands now. About a quarter of a Century has passed since then, and we have examined the change with some perspective. For this purpose, we did a field study of a number of firms in Albania through in-depth interviews with managers, before and after the change took place. After some considerations about the communist systems and the Marxian theory underlying them, we present the main results of the interviews realized in Albania with people that were managers during the socialist period, and people that are managers now. We then compare the results and analyze the differences to draw some conclusions about management control systems that can be generalized under the two systems.

Keywords

1.        Introduction

Undoubtedly, the World substantially changed after “the fall of the Berlin wall”, which is the informal expression to indicate the end of most communist regimes. For quite a while, in the second half of the 20th Century, Albania was considered the possibly most radical communist country, even beyond Mao’s China, and was an isolated country in Europe. Then, after the fall of the Berlin wall, it evolved towards some form of western capitalism, which is where it stands now (Bezemer, 2009; Blejer et al., 1992).

This change took place with some turmoil, but no bloodshed, and was (and still is) a fascinating story by itself. Not surprisingly, from a management point of view, and, more specifically, from the point of view of management control, it becomes very interesting to study the way things changed there. Management Control Systems (i.e., the systems that have to do with planning, establishing goals, evaluating performance, and so on) are an essential tool in management, and are the main objective of our inquiry. That is, in brief, how firms were managed in the communist regime, and how are they being managed today, mainly from the point of view of control systems, i.e., the way objectives for the firm (and for its subunits) are established, how is their accomplishment evaluated and what consequences it has for the compensation of managers. About a quarter of a Century has passed since then, and now may be a good time to examine the change with some perspective.

For this purpose, we did a field study of a number of firms in Albania through in-depth interviews with managers, before and after the change took place. The essential questions that we intended to ask had to do with

–           To what extent there were then / are now non-economic or non-monetary motives.

–           To what extent there were then /are now informal controls and, if yes, to what extent they predominated over formal ones.

–           What role does ideology played in this change of economic system?

–           To what extent one system of management was tougher, stricter, tighter than the other, and, thus, how much management discretion did they have

–           To what extent people were “happier” or “unhappier” then than they are now

These are, of course, complex questions and the answers are not easy (Luthans and Riolli, 1997). Comparing two situations that have happened one after the other is always difficult; and, besides, the whole world changed considerably during this time, having an undoubted influence in what happened in Albania. Our objective, then, is a first, qualitative approximation to the regime change, and its effect on the welfare of the population of Albania.

2.        Capitalist Systems vs. Communist Systems

Communist countries have allegedly attempted to implement Marx’s proposals for a new society. However, it is not difficult to see that what was actually done was different in different countries. The Soviet Union started at the beginning with a libertarian approach and all firms were nationalized and managed by local committees, until Lenin established the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1922, giving priority to industry, and allowing for some small private firms while the big ones, manly in the heavy industries and banking, were owned and run by the government. A Central Planning Board made all the important decisions in the economy, interacting with the managers of the firms, but with a top down approach. It was a capitalism of state, as Lenin himself declared, run by “democratic centralism”. Within what used to be the Soviet Union, we can find Bolshevism, Leninism, Stalinism, Trotskyism; and later, in other countries, Maoism, Western Communism, and even later Eurocommunism. The “standard”, though, was the NEP evolution under Stalinism: central planning, tough management, and very little private initiative (Schnytzer, 1982; Persson, 2010).

Countries other than Russia, which become communist after World War II, took different ways to communism. Poland, for instance, followed (allegedly) the theory of Lange (1938), who become the minister of the economy and attempted to put into practice his theory, but had to adapt it to reality. Hungary ended up with what was called “goulash communism”. Czechoslovakia was possibly the most advanced communist country, and Romania had towards the end a special, Ceaucescu brand of communism. China had its own brand of communism as well, and gave priority to the agriculture in a decentralized way to feed its people; and, then, made a disastrous move in the “Cultural Revolution”. Thus, one cannot say that there is a Marxist way of running a country’s economy, except for the fact that all of them had a central planning in the spirit of the NEP of Lenin, and of the Stalinist brand of communism that became the international “standard”, but implemented in very different ways.

Actually, Marxist analysis, establishes a way of analyzing and diagnosing social and economic problems, but has in abstract very few proposals with respect to how to run the economy.

In this context, Albania was rather singular (Albania, a Patrimony of European values, Several authors, 2000). Towards the end of the communist regime, it was a unique country, with practically no alliance with anybody else in the world, and considered by its leaders as the only “correct” place in terms of implementation of communism.

It was only in 1912 that Albania became independent after four centuries of domination by the Ottoman Empire. Then came World War I, and in the between wars period it was first a Republic, then a (democratic) monarchy, and invaded in 1939 by Italy. After a brief period of a partly liberated Albania, it was occupied by Germany in September 1943, after fascist Italy’s surrender. It was finally liberated on the 29 of November 1944.

During all those years, the Albanian movements that finally succeeded in liberating the country had been forming and organizing. First as National Liberation Army, then as a National Liberation Front, that later became Democratic Front.

When communism took over (late 40’s – early 50’s) it first had a close relationship with neighboring Yugoslavia, which had its own brand of communism (“Titoism”, for Josip Broz, “Tito”, the Yugoslavian leader). Soon, however, Albania broke relations with that country when Yugoslavia broke with Moscow’s Stalinist regime, and negotiated to receive American aid (which no other communist country wanted to negotiate at that time) in 1949 and early 50’s. Then, the Soviet Union became the supporter of Albania for a while, and the 60’s saw a reconstruction of the country until the radical leader of Albania, Enver Hoxha, after the death of Stalin, decided that the Soviet Union was becoming too “liberal” and broke diplomatic relations between the two countries, turning to China exclusively for aid and technological help. The 1976 Constitution approved that Albania would not have any type of relationship with the two big powers (USA and USSR).

3.        Marxian economics and management

Lange’s theory mentioned before (Lange, 1938) was not really applied in practice, not even in Poland. The decentralized way of allocating resources through a price mechanism that Lange suggested, with prices determined by a central planning board acting as an auctioneer, was not eve given a chance. The “democratic centralism” and the “central planning” of the economies was much more the rule, based on Stalinist principles.

One basic theoretical underpinning of Marxist theory is the “law of value”. The “law of value”, to be distinguished from the “labor theory of value” proceeding from classical economists like Malthus and Ricardo. It states at the same time something “factual” that happens in capitalist economies and a normative idea of what it should be. What should be is that the exchange of commodities in monetary terms should be the proportion of the socially necessary work, or time spent in producing the commodities. Thus, if commodity A requires 100 hours of socially necessary labor, and commodity B requires only 20, the price of A should be five times that of B.

The empirical “fact” that Marx observed in capitalistic economies was that this did not happen; rather there was a “surplus value” that went beyond the socially necessary labor and that the capitalists took for themselves at the expense of the workers.

The consequence of this law is that in a communist economy, prices should be established by the Central Planning Board based on such criterion (and therefore, not based on Lange’s theory of CPB becoming an “auctioneer” to take into account the demand and supply considerations).

If private property is, in practical terms, abolished, then “capital” is owned and allocated by the state. Therefore, it does not make sense for firms to have profits, and if there are, they should be turned over to the state again. All funds generated by operations (including a possible fair amount of depreciation) should be turned over to the state, except for reinvestment purposes, since the state is the one who provides the funds for investment.

The state will invest only in products considered “necessary”: “From each person according to his capacity, to each person according to his needs.” is a classical principle. Therefore, the CPB will make all product decisions (those products that are necessary) and, in the case of industrial products, provide the necessary capital. Salaries are also set by the CPB, and should be enough to satisfy workers’ needs.

Thus, improving the economic welfare of a country, what is needed is investment, mainly (in the Stalinist model) in the heavy industries

Interestingly, and because of the previous analysis, Marxism and some aspects of Taylorism become quite close. Taylor’s scientific management principles can be summarized as: (i) to substitute the intuition or “rules of thumb” of the workers by science and planning, (ii) to make production and management decisions based on empirical observation and measurement rather than tradition or whimsy or bargaining power and (iii) the belief that management is a reflective, evidence-based profession. (Kelly, 2016). Plants in a Stalinist economy had to be managed according to this idea. They could not control products, product mix or prices, and, hence, the essential variable to be controlled was production.

In a country that was rather backward and had many needs, increasing production was something crucial for the needs of the people. Capital was obtained from loans from first Yugoslavia, then the USSR, and later on China. In the 50’s and 60’s, Albania saw a substantial economic growth based on those principles.

Albania, possibly due to its isolation, has been understudied, and its management practices in special, with only a few exceptions (Papajorgji and Alikaj, 2015 and 2016; Nientied and Shutina, 2017)

4.        Methodology and results

To examine the issues enunciated above, we undertook an empirical (clinical) study in Albania. As stated above, we meant this to be the beginning of a more in-depth study that may take place subsequently and of which we will indicate the research questions we believe are still unanswered.

The field study developed in Albania was carried out on the premise of finding in the reality of the practice of the companies in communist Albania and in Albania at the present time the source of treatment of the diverse subjects on the implementation of the Systems of Direction and Control in the companies.

We believe this field study is a special contribution to the development of the fields of management and control in the companies, because the evolution of business practice in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe represents an unprecedented change in world economic history. We refer to the process of transition from a political, economic and social system that was dictatorial, centralized and with public ownership to a democratic and free market system. The Albanian experience, being a unique case because of the extreme communist position the country adopted offers the opportunity to study the evolution of the Management and Control Systems in companies subject to an even more profound change in comparison with that of the rest of the countries of the former communist bloc. Albania is the country that implemented in a more radical way than the rest of the former communist countries the ideological, political, economic and social principles of the social – communism of Marx, Engels and, later, Lenin and Stalin. The Albanian company has experienced a “natural shock” that is also unprecedented.

5.        Description of the Field Study

The field study has been carried out using a qualitative methodology: that of narrative analysis or content analysis. The study aims to find common themes and features in the information gathered from interviews with different people. The first part of the findings corresponds to the 1980-1990 period and is based on people who held management positions in their respective companies during the aforementioned period of time and have therefore been protagonists of the events described. The second group of testimonies corresponds to executives of different levels of Albanian companies in recent times (2014/15).

The selection of participants was based on intentional sampling. Two groups of people who collaborated with the study were selected. A first group was that of people who in the 80s held senior management positions in state companies. It was sought that these companies were representative, in terms of the economic activity of Albania, during the aforementioned period of time. Five interviews were held: one with a former senior manager of the industrial sector, one with a former senior manager of the agricultural sector, one with a former senior manager of the oil and mining sector and two with former senior managers of the service sector (Exhibit 1).

With respect to the information corresponding to the current period (XXI Century), contact was made with executives of two of the companies whose former managers of the period before the 1990s were interviewed in the first part of the field study, and who are still in operation. In the same way, six other companies that started the activity after the 90s were selected and managers from different levels of command were interviewed. The aforementioned companies are from the manufacturing, mass consumption, retail, services and industrial sectors. In total, eight interviews were conducted with current company managers (Exhibit 1)

 The interviews were in depth, in direct contact with the interviewees. In order to safeguard the narrative structure of the interview, we began by trying to make the interviewee aware of the purpose of our inquiry. Next, we used an interview guide (see Exhibit 3), which allowed the exploration of all relevant aspects of the investigation, without forgetting any of them, and without letting the interview deviate from the objective. Simultaneously, free narration was encouraged and, on occasion, he was encouraged to continue with sub-questions. The guide used for interviews with executives of current Albanian companies was the same as that used for interviews with former executives of Albanian companies in the period before the 1990s. The purpose of this was to highlight the same aspects or generic issues of the Control Systems, although with naturally different contents, to facilitate the subsequent comparative analysis.

The interviews were conducted in the natural environment of the interviewees, in Albania and in the Albanian language. The conversations were recorded, subsequently, faithfully transcribed in the Albanian language and translated into Spanish. The place where the interviews took place was reserved in the case of the interviewees’ former executives of the companies in activity during the period of the 1980s, in order to promote their spontaneous expression. On the other hand, the managers of the companies of the current period were interviewed within the environment of their own companies, for convenience and by indication and of themselves. The interview schedules, in both cases, were chosen by the interviewees. The average duration of the interview with executives of state companies from the period 1980-1990 was 64 minutes and the average duration of the interview with managers of Albanian companies at present was 62 minutes.

The interviews were made by one of the authors of the present article, (E. Ymery), who is Albanian by birth and by family origin, and lived in Albania until 1994. The Albanian language handling and the idiosyncratic knowledge of the environment allowed for an adequate first contact and fluid development of the interview.

A “bottom-up” analysis was carried out, that is, data and specific statements were collected and then grouped or collapsed into categories of treated topics. For this, the transcripts of the interviews were summarized, highlighting the statements about each of the topics and subtopics considered in the initial interview guide. Naturally, subjects that came out spontaneously during the same were also summarized.

From the summary of the interviews, the statements, main concepts (codes) of the interviewees were extracted and grouped. The codes were translated and grouped in seven major topics of the interviews made to company managers. A few significant statements of the interviewees are shown, translated into English, as Exhibit 3.

6.        The Management and Control Practices in the Albanian company before the change of the political, economic and social system of the 90’s.

6.1.     Planning and establishment of objectives

In the period before the 1990s, the planning process in Albania was complex and centralized, combining the short and long-term needs of the whole country and applying the principle of “relying on our own strengths”, consistently with the political moment. The established economic objectives openly supported political and ideological objectives, expressed above in the summary analysis of Marxist economics. The last ones were permanently communicated, to each one of the social and business tissues by the structures of the ALP, via political work. At company level, the objectives transmitted were mainly economic. The annual goals were established by the central governing bodies and were expressed in physical units. The pricing policy was the responsibility of the central planning bodies.

 

6.2.     Governance Structure of the Organization: The Role of the ALP

In each company, there were two parallel structures: the ALP and the administrative, nomenclature of the central bodies of the ALP and Government, respectively. Formally, the first was above the second. Theoretically, the double formal structure was given to create constructive opposition in the company. In practice, the relationship between both structures could go from one of a support nature and mutual support, to a conflictive relationship, depending on the personal and professional competence of the people in charge.

The structure of the company was functional, with no Board of Directors. This function was fulfilled by the base organization of the ALP. Managers should have the consent of the ALP when making decisions. Each minimum productive unit had a responsible professional, a technologist specialist to follow the technical standards and an economist to measure and monitor the yields.

A functional area of ​​special relevance and part of the administrative structure, but not the ALP, was Kuadri (the personnel area), name that comes from the word for high-level professionals. The Kuadri’s boss had to be necessarily a member of the ALP. It was the set of people that was responsible for implementing formal training policies, career line, performance evaluation and maintaining the professional and personal record of managers and employees.

 

6.3.     Preparation of the Budget or Annual Plan

The annual plan of the company included the economic objectives drawn up on the basis of the five-year plan, whose political, social and economic guidelines and objectives were formulated by the structure of the Albanian Labor Party (ALP), publicly communicated at the ALP Congresses and approved by the one-party parliament of the time. Subsequently, the guidelines passed to the State Planning Commission (the highest planning body), which was responsible for elaborating in detail the five-year plan to be executed, and from this, the plan was passed to the respective Ministries. The last ones were in charge of cutting the five-year plan into annual plans. These were sent to the Executive Committees at the departmental level, to reach finally each company.

The elaboration of the annual plan in each company began with the communication by the hierarchy of the ALP and Government of the expected production figures, established in a central manner based on the needs at the national level. The process followed with the discussion at the base to achieve the improvement of the initial goals and the elaboration of the Project Plan. This process was witnessed directly by the ALP and company’s top managers. The role of the ALP was that of the motivation of the masses so that reserves are not maintained at the time of the elaboration of the Project Plan.

The Project Plan was passed to the ALP base organization of each company, to be subsequently sent to the local executive government, where it was consolidated with the Project Plan of all other companies, organizations and / or local institutions. Finally, the Project Plan was sent to the Central Government. The submitted Project Plan could be returned for adjustments, either by the local or by the central government, so that it responds to central demands of the ALP and the State. The Project Plan was integrated at the country level, was approved by the government, the Party and the Parliament and was raised to the level of law.

The approved plan returned to the companies to be disaggregated to the basic units of production and / or service. Often the figures that were returned did not coincide with the Plan Project sent. The figures reported could undergo no modifications, since they combined in an integrated way the needs of the whole country. The motto was “The fulfillment of the Plan is obligation, achieving more than budgeted is an honor”.

 

6.4.     Execution of the Annual Plan or Budget

The management structures and the ALP were deeply involved in the process of implementing the Plan. The base organization of the ALP led the process. The fulfillment of the economic goals had fundamental relevance when treated as a means of compliance with the major political and ideological objectives. These objectives had as a background the intention to demonstrate of the superiority of the socialist system over Western imperialist capitalism and against the “revisionism” of the communist countries of Eastern Europe.

The execution was accompanied by much “political work” to achieve the motivation of the people. The ALP’s role was one of “vigilance” regarding the progressive fulfillment of goals. The role of the management structure is reduced to the detailed disaggregation of the Plan and to its execution to the minimum detail. The achievement of the goals of the Plan was mandatory. The administrative and directive structure and structure of the ALP closely followed the progress with monthly, weekly and, depending on the nature of the work, even on a daily basis.

The main indicators of compliance with the goals had to do with the volume produced, the costs, the quality, the investment plan. Qualitative indicators were also specified for service companies. All the indicators were economic. In case of non-compliance with the goals, the causes were analyzed and classified as objective and subjective. Non-compliance due to subjective causes had negative consequences of different magnitude. In the cases of inflated progress reports, the consequences were serious, and if it involved managers, even more so.

 

6.5.     The internal organs in charge of control

The company was controlled very closely by formal instances of local and central government. The purpose of these controls was to diagnose the progress of the plan and, at the same time, safeguard the proper use of state resources.

The “customer” companies also exercised control, since they could give notice to the local and central control bodies of the eventual non-compliance of the supplies, which risked the advance of that “customer company”.

The staff department or “Kuadri” seconded the control that the base organization of the ALP exercised over people, their behavior and their performance.

The economic department of the company had an informative role to the hierarchies of management and the ALP, making available to them the reports of the achievements vs. what was planned.

 

6.6.     Motivation, Evaluation and Compensation

In order to motivate people, a mixture of persuasion and coercion was used permanently. Persuasion predominated in the goal-setting phase and had to do with the needs of the country, the need of a work well-done to be useful for the citizens, and so on, while coercion predominated in the execution phase. This phase was characterized by very close monitoring and detailed analysis. Compliance or noncompliance could be due to “objective” causes – all causes unrelated with people’s performance, such as conditions of supply of raw material, level of execution of investments, etc. Alternatively, causes could be “subjective”, i.e., causes that had to do with what people did or did not do well, or “objective” and “subjective” at the same time. Non-compliance due to subjective causes did not deserve any consideration (at least formally).

Special attention was paid to the managers. In a physical individual file was recorded the scores of evaluations, achievements, failures, the level of convergence of the person with the “Party line” and incidences at work and those of a personal nature. The monitoring of the workers was done through the implementation of piecework where possible. The standard yields were, in general, well studied technically.

There was a formal system of rewards and punishments in which stimuli and/or moral prizes predominated. The material stimuli were very small and were used, mainly, for the lower hierarchical levels (workers and workers). Under the slogans of “the class struggle”, “rapprochement with the masses”, “struggle against bourgeois customs”, the ratio of the lowest salary to the highest was 1:2. Promotion policies and evaluation criteria incorporated the achievement of economic goals, as well as other criteria of political and ideological convergence.

The negative stimulus prevailed in the formal system of the Albanian company. Greater pressure was exerted on the managers, with regard to the, generally better motivational quality of the same. With the economic difficulties experienced in the 80s, the negative stimuli began to lose strength.

 

6.7.     Management Style and Organizational Culture

The predominant business culture was to try to fulfill a personal profile of “format”, in which people should fit. It was a restrictive culture and pressure to maintain the behavior of each person within what was accepted by the “socialist moral.” In this same framework, the organs of the ALP insisted on the fight against economic and social differences between people.

7.        Management and Control Practices in the Albanian company after the change of the political, economic and social system of the 1990’s.

7.1.     Planning and establishment of objectives.

The process of firm planning (no longer depending on central planning) by companies currently in Albania is done therefore in a decentralized manner. This incorporates the influence of external variables of the sector, market, macroeconomic and political situation of the country, etc. Even in the public enterprise, planning is decentralized, but based on a sectoral strategy at the national level, prepared by the central government. The current planning process involves substantially less resources and time. Albanian companies inherit a widespread culture of planning, regardless of size.

 

7.2.     The Government Structure of the Organization

In all the companies interviewed, the Shareholders’ Meeting is responsible for medium and long-term decisions. In addition, companies have the Board of Directors, composed of the CEO and the main managers. It is this instance that leads the execution of the annual objectives established by the Shareholders’ Meeting.

The organizational structure is functional. All the companies interviewed had the Audit Department, which reports directly to the Shareholders’ Meeting. This department, in addition to fulfilling an audit role of the economic and financial aspects of the company, in several of them extends its functions to aspects of implementation of processes, rules, regulations and, sometimes, on the quality of the management of the responsible people.

 

7.3.     Preparation of Budget or anual Plan

The use of the budget as a planning tool is widespread in the (relatively big) companies interviewed. Budgets are prepared during the second half of the year. In large companies, the budget preparation process starts with the creation of an ad-hoc working group, while in small companies it is the economic department that prepares the budget, after compiling data from the other departments.

The approval of the budget is made by the Board of Directors and the Shareholders’ Meeting. The boards can make adjustments based on the growth needs and / or incorporation of variables / external premises that have not been taken into account in the elaboration process.

The approved budget is communicated back and disaggregated by each area. Sometimes, disaggregated budget targets are printed in a special brochure. More or less the standard procedures that take place in any western firm.

 

7.4.     The Execution of the Annual Plan or Budge

In the Albanian companies interviewed in the current period, the main mechanism of execution and compliance with the budget is very close monitoring through the formal compilation of progress in performance forms. There is a certain flexibility to revise the annual goals, at the request of the responsible manager and in case the assumptions of the budget have not been taken place. The fulfillment of the objectives is considered by the managers much easier than in the period before the 90s by the fact of having the necessary resources to do so.

 

7.5.     The internal organs in charge of control.

In the Albanian companies currently interviewed there is a functional department in charge of control. In large companies the aforementioned department has a more informative role and the functional areas are empowered to negotiate the objectives and report the performance directly in the Board of Directors. In a service company, the personnel department was directly involved in controlling the level of service by employees.

The Audit Department mentioned above exercises control over the implementation of processes, rules, regulations and even the quality of the management of people. On the latter, it reports directly to the Board of Directors.

 

7.6.     Motivation, Evaluation and Compensation

The most common forms of motivation in the Albanian business firm today is extrinsic in the form of rewards and punishments. The implementation of them is varied. In the public company there are very few stimuli and material rewards, due to lack of economic capacity and management style inherited from the previous period, which had a strong tendency not to “pamper the managers”. Private companies implement without exception economic awards of different nature to encourage compliance with the goals.

The recruitment processes, sometimes, are long and consider not only the technical capacity, but also the personal quality and the degree of “fit” with the way of doing  things of the organization, its essential mission and culture..

A very close monitoring of performance and results obtained, incidents occurred, reprimands, congratulations, etc. is exercised. They are formally registered in individual files. However, close monitoring is not perceived, generally, as coercion; on the contrary, it is perceived as a means to maintain order, discipline and promote compliance.

In two firms, “self-management” schemes were implemented to motivate people to achieve better results. The degree of success of this practice was not clear or uniform.

 

7.7.     Management Style and Organizational Culture

The current management style is more democratic than it used to be- It features, delegation of functions, participation to establish the objectives and involvement in monitoring them. However, the culture of very close monitoring of execution is still predominant in the company. In the public company a more autocratic style of work is appreciated and, in general, there is a more expectant and demanding trend towards managers, while less material rewards are being used

8.        Discussion: Assessment pf what is common and what is different in the practice of Management in Albanese firms

8.1.     Planning and Establishment of Objectives

The process of centralized planning of the socialist stage of Albania implied complexity because of the fact of having to combine the short term with the medium and long term objectives, of a political, ideological and economic nature and at the country level. These same objectives, in each of the aforementioned fields, represented the premise of the planning process in each of the organizations or companies of the time.

The first relevant aspect to mention follows from this: the sense of mission with which the planning process in the company was impregnated. Regardless of the content of the mission, the permanent communication and the work of the ALP structures to break down the objectives, make them understandable and follow up their implementation equipped the process of establishing objectives with an outstanding sense of mission, at least before the economic crisis of the 80s hit the country. People in companies and government bodies, to a large extent, shared the ideals of collective welfare, and not only economic, that the regime professed. It was the unifying power of shared mission that made it possible to execute such a complex process of planning the economic, political, social and cultural activity of a whole country and according to collective needs. A sign of the unifying power of shared mission is the same generalized decline in the productivity of Albanian companies and the same system in the 1980s, a period in which the belief of people that welfare ideals could be reached via the political and economic model proposed economic was vanishing.

In the current practice of Albanian companies, it is difficult to impregnate the planning and other control processes with a sense of mission. Generally, the agglutinating elements of the people around what the Albanian company of today intends to do, are of a lower hierarchy. They appeal mainly to extrinsic and perhaps intrinsic motives, with clear emphasis on the former.

The second aspect to be derived is the level of predictability of the results to be achieved that careful planning makes possible. In fact, the effectiveness (independently of the efficiency) of the achievement of the goals established was clear in the previous system. Today, in the public service company interviewed, we have seen inconsistencies and some incoherence when implementing the development plans of the company. Unclear objectives and little planning of how to achieve them have dramatically reduced the effectiveness of execution.

The companies of today in Albania (those interviewed at least) inherit a generalized culture of planning. In conditions of an environment with high levels of uncertainty, this culture supports the achievement of the established strategic goals. But, comparatively, planning in companies today requires much less time, effort and resources for the same fact that only covers each company separately. The planning process is of course conditioned by the external conditions of the company, as premises to the plan. At the same time, they have to make decisions they did not have to do before (products, prices, and so on) which make the planning process more complex.

 

8.2.     Preparation of the Budget or Annual Plan

The preparation of the Annual Plan in the Albanian companies during the socialist period was crucial, because the Plan of each company was a link in the chain of plans of each and every one of the organizations at the national level. All plans were then integrated into the master Plan, whose approval was formalized by the Parliament. The Plan had the status of law and its compliance was mandatory.

The process of preparing the Plan was rigorous and participatory. The Plan – Projects in each company began with the communication of the expectations of figures of the central organs of the ALP and the State. The figures to be achieved were widely and formally discussed, in meetings, in each of the productive units. Successively, the discussion of the figures and of the possibilities of improvement of the same ones via improvement in the processes, savings and increase of the effort of the people, continued in an orderly manner in the production units from bottom to top, until reaching the economic department and, finally, obtain the approval of the Director of the company. The final seal to the Project Plan was placed by the organization of the company’s ALP.

The broad discussion of the goals to achieve in the plan was intended to ensure that the people that executed the plans, the figures and the goals were the authors of the plans, and, thus, assumed a strong commitment to compliance. The process itself was consistent with the importance of the subsequent achievement of these figures. While the establishment of the goals was done in a technical way, without exaggerated revolutionary enthusiasm or pressure, the process served to generate the desired commitment with the achievement of these goals.

To the extent that the economic demands were increasing as a result of the increase in the needs of the population, and to the extent that “the machinery” of the economic model started to show strong inefficiencies and the inability to be self-sustaining. Then, participation in the process of Preparation of the Project Plan became a process that, although formally well executed, really forced people to report the figures desired by the central organs of Government and Party. The decrease of material resources and investments that followed was supposed to be overcome with ever greater effort issued by people and, above all, by managers. The lack of realism and technical support of the required figures ended up reducing the commitment to achieve them. The requirement to achieve them when it was impossible ended up in generating demotivation.

In the interviews carried out, the former director of the Metallurgical Corporation emphasized how difficult it was to achieve the results required during the Albanian socialist period, compared to the achievement of the results at present, when the necessary material and investment resources are available. and proportional to the achievement of the goals.

In the Albanian companies at present, at least in the interviewed ones, they also use, to a certain extent, the participatory budget. Certainly, the participation in the elaboration of the budget is better appreciated in the larger companies than in the smaller companies in turnover. This is due to the fact that the management and the economics department of the larger companies are further away from the market and the customers and need the departments in contact with them to draw up a coherent budget. In smaller companies, the budget is drawn up in the economic department, approved by the Board of Directors, and simply communicated to the executing departments. Likewise, during the interviews, it became clear that there was a greater participation of the lowest levels of the organization in the establishment of the sales figure and much less, or very little in the sizing of the resources to reach them.

A second element to derive from the interviews in the process of preparing the Plan or Budget is the presence of senior managers and their direct involvement in them. In the socialist Albanian enterprise, the elaboration of the Plan was doubly guarded: on the one hand by the managers and, on the other, by the structures of the ALP. This high level of involvement was consistent with the need to have a realistic and demanding plan at the same time. The presence of the highest executives of the company and the Party fulfilled a motivating function as well.

The “vigilance” in the elaboration of the Plan, especially by the Party structures, was accompanied by a dense “political work” and propaganda of struggle against comfort and conformity, for the infusion of the process with the revolutionary spirit of the working class and so on. The elaboration of the Plan was the key moment: from there emanated the demands of later execution. As mentioned above, from the moment that the directive presence began to be forced to support unrealistic plans and goals demanded by “the people up there” (the ALP organs and the local and central governments), the motivating function of such presence decreased further and further.

In the current company in Albania, the direct involvement of managers or their intense presence in the budgetary process was not always detected. Budgets, although present in each of the companies interviewed, generally represented a compilation of figures from the different levels without, necessarily coming from a broad discussion about them. The commitment to the achievement of the goals is achieved mainly through incentives.

8.3.     The execution of the Annual Plan (or Budget)

Close monitoring of the implementation of the Plan or Budget characterized and characterizes today the Albanian companies today. The culture of planning, the tight monitoring seems to be inherited from the companies of the socialist period. Monitoring generally involves the disaggregation of the goals included in the Plan or Budget in goals for each productive unit, monthly reviews of results at the departmental level, weekly monitoring with work plans at the level of the lowest units of execution

However, by the very nature of a centrally planned state economy, the monitoring of compliance with the Plan was extremely narrow in the socialist Albanian enterprise. Compliance with the figures in the Plan was considered an obligation. Negligence could be interpreted as an act against the interests of the Party and the nation and have serious professional and even personal consequences.

The execution of the Plan in the socialist enterprise did not contemplate any flexibility, at least in the words of the former executives interviewed. The absence of flexibility was a consequence of the need for the concatenation of the results or activities of each organization or company with the rest of them, in the way that the economic and social “machinery” will work.

The substantial difference with the today companies in Albania, although the culture of close monitoring persists, is that the latter is combined with greater flexibility and possible revision of the goals established according to the attainment or not of the assumptions of investments in the company, market performance, macroeconomic and social conditions, etc. The combination of close monitoring with some flexibility in achieving the economic and service goals in today’s companies creates better conditions for achieving the medium and long-term objectives of the company. Likewise, monitoring and flexibility at the same time are better ingredients for learning and motivation of people towards the achievement of goals. It should be mentioned that not in all the companies interviewed existed both ingredients at the time of the execution of the budgets, at least according to the interviewees.

The process of implementing the Plan in the socialist Albania company was heavily safeguarded by the management structure but, above all, by the structure of the ALP. The execution, in a similar way to the aforementioned control processes, required to continue building in people the sense of mission. Therefore, an intense political, ideological and training work was developed to make people internalize the need to comply with the requirements of the Plan. The main leitmotiv in the formal meetings of “political work”, as they were called, was the need and demand to watch over the interests of all, over their own, and the interests and political and ideological ambitions of the socialist regime that embodied (at least theoretically) the search for the welfare of the whole town. With the passing of time and in practice, when the capacity of the political, economic and social organization then in force to achieve the desired welfare was not proven, the mission became little credible and motivating.

Thus, depending on who were the people that formed the Kuadri, this process could be functional or dysfunctional. It could be functional in the sense of the why’s and avoiding exploitation; dysfunctional because of fanaticism and too demanding unreasonable things.

 

8.4.     The Structure of the Organization Governance

In the context of the Governance Structure, we can observe the double role or mandate that is required of the formal structure of the organization, of course, that rests on the managers. This double function lies in (i) organizing the work so that it is executed with the efficiency and effectiveness required, and (ii) motivating people towards the achievement of the first two objectives in a sustainable manner.

In the Albanian company of the socialist regime there was a double formal structure: the ALP and the administrative management or the organization. The first had a higher hierarchy function: the function of ensuring that the sense of purpose of the work and the issuance of an increasing effort on the part of the people were kept alive. This went through the task of ideological formation and personal education of all the members, including the managers themselves, both of the structure of the ALP, as of the administrative management.

The formal administrative management fulfilled the functions of planning and executing the economic results of the company, mainly in terms of output. The unfolding of these two functions shows the relevance that the regime gave to the motivating and educating function of the members in an organization.

In the current company in Albania both functions, the administrator and the management and motivation of people, are entrusted to the same formal structure, in the same way it happens in the Western world. In the interviews it was possible to appreciate that the focus of the managers was the fulfilment of the goals and objectives of the company and it was typical to highlight only the efforts of technical and administrative training of the people for that purpose.

The practice of control systems of socialist Albania rises another interesting issue about the formal structure and the real structure in the companies of that period. Of the two parallel structures in each organization – that of the ALP and the administrative or management – formally, the first was above. In practice, the leadership was softened by personal and professional quality, both of the secretary of the ALP organization and of the managers. On paper, the double formal structure, that of the Party and the administrative one, was intended to create constructive opposition and thus guarantee the progress of the work. In practice, the relationship between the two structures could vary from one of a conflictive nature to a relationship of mutual support, depending on the quality of the people who formed them. This clearly showed the existence of the informal organization even in a dictatorial economic and political system strongly dominated by formal systems.

 

8.5.     The Control Organs

Parallel to the “reinforced” formal structure, the formal organs of control were also duplicated in the Albanian companies in the socialist period. The control exercised was very strict and was exercised not only on the economic and management results, but also on the people.

Local governments exercised periodic control and, besides, the central government bodies in charge of economic and managerial control did so. These formal control bodies were not part of the company.

Within the company, the ALP organization and the managers exercised control over people, both based on the progress reports of the plan from the economic department. The “Kuadri” seconded the control that the ALP exercised over people, their behavior and performance. The participation and involvement of the party and hierarchy in the process of controlling the management and the people was total.

In the current practice of Albanian companies, those in charge of formal control are the economic departments, which provide information to the Board of Directors and the shareholders. In parallel and with a direct report to the Board of Directors, in all the companies interviewed, the Audit department is in charge of management control, and examines the compliance of the processes and procedures by the people, aspects of regulation, etc. The direct reports of this department to the Board of Directors are essential for evaluating people’s performance. There is some involvement of the company’s top management in the management control and people’s performance, but only to a lesser extent. The control exercised is mostly indirect, based on formal systems such as measurement by economic results and incentives.

 

8.6.     Motivation, Evaluation and Retribution of People

To motivate people towards the achievement of the objectives and goals established by the State and the Party, in the Albanian enterprise of the socialist regime a mixture of persuasion and coercion was used, permanently. Persuasion predominated in the goal-setting phase, while coercion predominated in the execution phase. It has already been mentioned that the “political and ideological work”, carried out in systematically programmed meetings, was a means of motivational support to give the work of each person the appropriate relevance, face to the achievement of the economic results.

The evaluation process was systematic and rigorous. This involved detailed analyzes of the level of fulfillment of the goals, assessment of the causes of eventual non-fulfillment, establishment of responsibilities and the distribution of the respective awards and punishments. Coherently with the appeal to collective transcendence, moral prizes predominated.

It was characteristic of the regime to exercise greater pressure and control over professionals and intellectuals, in general, and over managers, in particular. The ratio of the lowest salary to the highest salary did not exceed 1 to 2. The directors submitted to the demagogic pressure to “merge with the masses”, “to fight against the bourgeois mystic psychology” and “to feed with the revolutionary spirit of the working class”. One of the interviewees said that the cases of punishment were not very frequent, because the Party took care not to apply them to professionals or managers and not in a massive way, “but when they occurred, they generated fear”.

An integral part of the evaluation process was the level of convergence of the person, and specially the managers, with the “Party line”. The evaluation of the workers and / or employees was done by the direct managers.

However, in the realm of formal systems and the restrictive means of work and life, such as the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat installed in Albania, was the set of informal relations between the people in the Albanian companies that represented a layer of protection and damping of the effects of the formal system on them. The formal structures in the companies, be they of the Party or of management, were not only fully aware of their existence, but made use of the “spontaneous system” of relations “not tot harm” the people who should not be harmed. One of the interviewees gave the example of the manager who was not paid his salary because of not meeting the economic goals for reasons unrelated to his own management and that months later, discreetly, was given a compensation in the form of a bonus. These apparent inconsistencies were the product of the effort not to antagonize the managers and, at the same time, not to take away the authority of the formal systems.

Albanian companies currently use, without exception, economic awards of different nature to encourage compliance with the goals. In general, there is also a very close monitoring of the performance of people on a departmental basis. Performance monitoring, at least in the words of one of the interviewees, was not perceived as coercive; on the contrary, it was perceived as a means to maintain order, discipline and foster compliance.

 

8.7.     Management Style and Organizational Culture

The predominant culture in companies before the 1990s was a total focus on achieving economic results (output), which were seen as a means to collective welfare. People, individually, were seen as means to achieve the collective good

For this, the person was forced to fit into preconceived “formats” of personal profile. The source of these formats was the ideological influence of the Party and its desire to create the stereotype of the revolutionary man, permanently pushed towards a transcendence imposed from the outside. On one occasion, one of the former managers interviewed expressed that they were educated to be ashamed to think about themselves, before thinking about collective interests. The regime permanently appealed to a kind of collective transcendence, in which the person, individually, was almost invisible.

In general, it was a restrictive culture for people, a pressure to maintain the behavior of each person within the accepted by the “socialist moral.” The expressions and behaviors other than that were labeled liberals, bourgeois or, at the other extreme, conservatives. Part of the same culture was the fight against economic and social differences between people.

The current reality of the culture of the Albanian company does not say anything about the care and protection of the person. Similarly, today, people in general are considered a means for the organization to achieve its economic goals.

9.        Appreciation of the Evolution of Management and Control in the Albanian Company from Period to Period

The assessment of the Management and control practices which has been exposed and analyzed in this paper, will not take into account the political and ideological issues that naturally surround the issues about different social, economic and political systems , like those that took place in Albania. The spirit of the study has always been to draw consequences of some observations, contrast, assess and contribute to the theory and implementation of the Management and Control Systems of organizations.

What we intended to achieve with this work is to highlight practices of control and management systems in companies, whose mention and treatment are considered relevant to take steps towards an adequate understanding of them. Returning to those topics, as we do below, has as a purpose the vindication of the classic vision on the systems of management and control, far from the purely statistical considerations.

In fact, regardless of the more or less adverse environment in which companies or organizations developed their activity, there are aspects of their management control that remain valid in time and worthy of being highlighted and not be “despised” for having belonged to periods of this or that political, ideological or socio – economic environment. An important reason for being able to deal with the various topics in this chapter are the experiences gathered in the interviews with the former directors of companies of the socialist period in Albania; This, with no intent of undervaluing the information revealed by company managers today. In our view, the interviewees, former managers of the 90’s, speak with a better perspective and a more realistic appreciation of what happened at that time, thanks to the time elapsed and thanks to the quality of former managers in contrast with current managers.

 

9.1.     Summary ideas to highlight:

It is the sense of mission in the management of the company that mobilizes people. But the quality of the mission must be taken care of. A mission that appeals to a collective transcendence, as before in Albania, or that which reigns today, based on extrinsic individualism, takes away authenticity and motivating power from it. The way to motivate people is not coherent with the motivational reality of human people: many do not move for extrinsic reasons only, or for transcendent reasons only.

Careful planning and the participation of executors in it supports the achievement of strategic goals. Planning that increases the level of predictability of the results and the participation of the people commits them to their achievement. The culture of planning inherited from the socialist Albanian company is proof of the practical value of this element of management. The socialist Albania and in conditions of an external environment to the stable company, the planning functioned as a process that unifies the needs of all the companies, organizations and institutions at the country level. At present, in conditions of external environment to the changing company, the planning, combined with the flexibility in the execution, equal conjugates the efforts of the people in a same direction.

The monitoring in combination with the flexibility in executing what is planned also supports the achievement of the goals but above all in achieving them in an increasingly efficient way. The lack of flexibility emphasized the achievement of economic goals above all in the socialist Albania company. But, achieving the results, that is to say, the achievement of effectiveness does not guarantee, as in fact did not guarantee, the achievement of the same objective through time and in an increasingly efficient way, a process that supports the achievement of medium-term objectives. and long-term organization and its longevity. In other words, it is important not only to achieve the results, but also how they are achieved, whether each time is more efficient or not. And, what is more important to bear in mind, how does the relentless attempt to achieve the results impact on the people in the organization?

The management and control in a company means to exercise the decision-making functions and the motivating functions by the managers. The structure of the Albanian company before 90 was split into the administrative structure and structure of the organization of the ALP. The second, formally, had a higher hierarchy and exercised motivating / educating functions towards people, and the former exercised mainly decision-making functions. The unfolding of these functions, reflected even in the formal structure, shows the relevance of the motivating and educating function of the members in an organization to mobilize them towards the direction required by the organization. Of course, the mere existence of formal structures and systems does not guarantee their proper use of them at all.

Formal management and control systems are necessarily accompanied by informal ones. Both systems, formal and informal, naturally lie side by side in every organization of human beings. Informal systems are based on the spontaneous interactions of people in the organization and have the task, in principle, to soften the possible negative effects of formal systems on themselves. The existence of informal systems and structures is evident in the Albanian company today, as it was in the company of the socialist period.

Management and control should not only be exercised on the results, but also, and above all, on the people. Moreover, there is no way to exercise control over the results without doing so on people (Merchant, 1985). When the types and content of control over people are not made explicit, being aware of their existence and exercise by managers, there is a risk that the control type executed on the results requires a rigid, implicit type of control over people, which can be perfectly counterproductive and not consistent with the nature of human persons in an organization.

10.   Conclusions

It is clear that the business practices in Albania, before the 90s and after, took place in very different historical, socio – economic, ideological and political contexts and no doubt opposites. Albania went, in a matter of a decade, from a totally planned economy to a free market one. The change was unprecedented.

That is why the study of business practices in terms of control systems before and after arouse legitimate interest. In the common and in the different of these practices we find a revealing source of issues of Control Systems and the management of companies that far from going out of style, are more effective than ever

The study of the experience of the Albanian companies during and after the stage of the socialist regime shows that, independently of the formal political, economic and social environment in which the organizations carry out their activity, the Management and Control Systems are elements of direction always present and necessary to organize and direct the efforts of the people towards the fulfillment of the purpose. Both elements are complementary. The tools of control systems represent the formal part of the control and the management control has to do with all the rest of the spontaneous managerial activity (not foreseen in the formal systems) that necessarily complements the former.

Both elements, coherently combined, have the ability to drive the “hearts and minds” of people towards the fulfillment of the mission of the organization. The lack of coherence between these two managerial elements causes the motivation efforts of people to fail to do what the organization requires to be done. And the successes and failures in the implementation of both management practices are not exclusive, neither of the organizations or companies in a planned economy, nor of those that operate in a free market.

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EXIBIT 1

Data of the interviewees

 

 

Nr.

Position

Period

Enterprise

Industry

Before the 1990s

1

Former Maintenance technical manager

1980-1990

Metallurgical Elbasan

Manufacturing

2

Former Secretary General in the Ministry of En­ergy and Industry

1980-1990

Ministry of Energy and Industry

Central Government

3

Chief agronomist

1980-1990

Agrarian Cooperative of Krutje

Agriculture

4

Former General Manager

1985-1994

Water Supply Company of the city of Tirana

Services

5

Former General Manager

1985 – 1990

Water Supply Company of agricultural area of Lushnjë

Agriculture

After the 1990s

1

Associate General Manager

2014

UKT (Ujësjellës dhe Kanaliz­ime Tiranë – Supply and Col­lection Company of Tirana)

Services

2

General Manager

2014

Firm in the Catering Business

Services

3

Human Resource Manager

2014

AGNA Group

Commerce

4

Product Portfolio Manager

2014

EUROSIG- Insurance Group

Services

5

Technical Manager

2014

Planta de Acero de Elbasan de la Kurum Albania

Manufacturing

6

General Manager

2014

Delta Group

Commerce

7

Financ. Manager

2014

Doniana-Shoe Manufacturer

Manufacturing

8

General Manager

2014

SHAGA Design & Furniture

Manufacturing

 

 

 

 

 

EXIBIT 2

Some of the most significant statements of the interviewees

 

Before the 90s

“We, the engineers, provided figures based on technical considerations … in which there is no place for a “Party slogans “… but you should be very careful to affirm this.”

 “… when the crisis began there were problems … but still nothing was forgiven; … Party meetings were held once a month. I did not report whether I had lived or not well or had gone to the movies or not; I reported how I had made the plan every day. “

“The punishment for the violation of work discipline or technical discipline were clearly foreseen in the work code. The boss had power to soften them a bit by arguing a bit when he wanted to. If he did not want… he did not… “

“The Party covered the aspect of mobilization, of the spirit of the working class, of the struggle against the concept of comfort, of the struggle against reserves to… exploit the reserves (of effort on the part of the people) to the maximum possible.”

 “The poor Manager, when he could not fulfill his plan due to lack of materials or machinery, for example, was called to the Ministry and they took action: they did not pay him his salary. Being without a salary at that time was difficult. What would the Minister do? He would give gave him extra some financial compensation … the purpose was to mobilize people, not to harm them. “

Kuadri “was in charge of education (of workers and people in general), it even took care of problems and family discussions. If the wife complained, you were in trouble (laugh). You could complain to the Director or the “kuadri”. “

 “… you had to have reliability (e.g., for management positions) … both as a family background, as moral figure and technical preparation. They would not put just anyone, but you did not have to be a member of the Party. “

“If the engineer abused (e.g., inflated the figures) was a serious matter. … you were fired, … you had nowhere to go! These were extreme cases. Before this happened, the Party and the unions would be involved. They were rare cases, but they were scary, and they happened…”

 

 

 

After the 90s

“It is not that there is no possibility on the side of the economic capacity of the company (to deliver economic incentives), but (the General Director of the state company) does not want to pamper the managers too much … there are department managers who really work a lot.”

“We do not work with papers (it refers to diplomas, moral recognitions only) … we give recognition with words of gratitude for a job well done and, generally, in the form of bonuses, lunches we make together … We are above all practical.”

Decision making today is faster; “It is done, or it is not done”. Then, the system was slower; “It was the system like that, besides that everyone wanted to do things by the book… we all fooled each other and the people up there..”

“… today if you do not work … you are fired in an hour … you feel more motivated but because of positive and negative incentives because you have to take care of yourself to take care of the work, because there is not much”.

“The economic objectives are increased every year … For example, currently we have reached 90% of the goal of the period, but it is better to achieve 90% of that goal than 100% of a lower goal.”

“… each form (e.g., of motivating) has its positive and negative sides, but the trend is positive … (the person) is more interested in looking for a market, in looking for clients … in not focusing so much on the work schedule … Here they keep the phone 24 hours a day; in the house too. If a customer calls you at night and tells you that he needs something and wants your quotation, the manager gives it to him from home. In general, they are more incentivized.”

“… now, here (in Albania.) we follow the culture of “I am the owner … and you must work; if you want to stay and, if not, go “… Really workers and employees do not realize how exploited they are, he cannot do the figures…”

 

 

 

EXIBIT 3

Interview Guide

Question 1

1) How were the goals and objectives of your organization or firm determined?

2) How often were these goals reviewed / revised?

3) What nature did they have? Economic and not economic?

4) Who formulated / formulated the tactics to achieve the goals and objectives of the organization?

5) How were they communicated to managers and people in their organization?

6) What were / are the control mechanisms designed to guide your organization towards the fulfillment of the goals and objectives set?

7) How effective was / is each of them?

8) How efficient?

9) What were / are the indicators determined to be able to measure the compliance with goals and objectives?

10) Were there / are there positive incentives? Negative incentives? The material incentives? The non-material? In what proportion?

11) Were there / are there responsibility centers in your organization? What kind?

12) Who was / is the person or internal body in charge of exercising control?

13) What was / is your responsibility?

14) What relationship did / do you have with those controlled, formally and informally?

15) How were the actual results evaluated / evaluated?

17) When the results were not reached / achieved, why did this happen? Due to external factors? Which? Because of internal factors? Which?

18) How were the results of the evaluation used / used in relation to people responsible for them?

19) What measures were taken / taken in the case of not achieving the results?

20) Was the scope or improvement of the expected results rewarded? In what way?

21) Were they trying / trying to harmonize the interests of the organization with those of the people individually? How?

22) How did the style of senior management influence / influence the process of planning and control in your organization?

23) How did the existing culture influence / influence your organization?

[FULL] Article 2, Volume 4 Issue 2

European mega deals during the sixth merger wave. Is the legal origin of the bidder and the target a determinant of short-term investor reaction?

Author

Monica Martinez-Blasco

Francesc Martori

Xavier Auguets-Pratsobrerroca

Abstract

In the context of the mega merger and acquisition announcements during the sixth merger wave in Continental Europe, this paper presents an analysis of the influence of the bidder and target legal origins in the short-term reactions of the cumulative abnormal returns, the cumulative absolute abnormal returns and the volume traded. 92 bids occurred between 2003 and 2007 have studied. Our main result is a short term negative abnormal return for the bidder stockholders’ firms as a consequence of the announcement, which can be mainly associated to the presence of companies whose legal origin is German. This reaction is also accompanied with a significant effect above the average level in the market volatility and the volume traded. Finally, there does not seem to be any significant different reaction depending on whether operations happen between companies from the same legal origin or from a different one.

Keywords

1.        Introduction

Merger activity comes in waves, and European merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity has been increasing in importance over time. The fifth merger wave (1993– 2000) showed that the European and US M&A activity could be equiparated. This increase in European takeover activity during the fifth merger wave resulted in increased research on European characteristics of such corporate transactions, given that, until then, empirical research on M&A activity was mostly focused on the US market. European legal origin differences among countries, and consequently, their distinct governance systems is also a valuable field of research on European corporate events. The Internet Dot Com Bubble burst and the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused an economic recession, and the consequent end of the fifth wave. The takeover market did not recover until 2003, which is considered the beginning of the sixth merger wave. This new wave ended abruptly in late 2007 due to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008.

 

While shareholders’ short-term wealth effects of European bids during the fifth European merger wave have been studied by several authors (Campa and Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006, Martynova and Renneboog, 2006; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011), the sixth merger wave has gone largely unnoticed in academia. To the best of our knowledge, only Campa and Hernando (2006) partially researched it by analysing a timeframe starting from 1998 and ending in 2006. However, they focused their study on financial firms in Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. It left the effects of mega deal announcements unexplored, while Goergen and Renneboog (2004) cut off their sample at US$ 100 million. We, on the other hand, propose an even higher cut off by analysing deals worth US$ 500 million or more.

 

The objective of this paper is to analyse the short-term market reaction of bidder firms toward the announcement of a M&A mega deal in Continental Europe during the sixth merger wave. As shown in related extant literature, we will focus on companies’ location as a determinant of investors’ price reactions. We will analyse the existence of differences in investor reaction that may arise due to the legal origin of the acquirer and target firms within Continental Europe. To obtain a complete picture of the market reaction, we do not only analyse changes in returns, but also expand the frame of analysis to volatilities and volume traded. The inclusion of the aforementioned market reaction indicators in this research is crucial, since it reveals reactions that would have been otherwise hidden by returns compensation.

 

We contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, we present more evidences to a limited stream of M&A research focused on Continental Europe. Research in this area is still centred on Anglo-Saxon countries, thereby increasing the difficulty in understanding Continental European markets. As a consequence, we also achieve a better understanding of investors’ reaction in governance systems different from the Anglo-Saxon system. Second, our research benefits extant literature by studying European takeover bids launched during the sixth takeover wave, particularly for mega deals. It has been already demonstrated that each wave shows different patterns and characteristics from its antecedents (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), and that the size of transactions should be considered determinants of market reaction (Rosen, 2006). Third, we aim to present an in-depth analysis of investors’ reactions based on the legal origins of the companies involved in the deal.

 

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review about M&A announcements in Europe and postulates our hypothesis. In section 3, we describe the sample and methodology used, and in section 4 we analyse the empirical results obtained. Finally, section 5 presents our final remarks.

 

2.        Literature review

 

Investors’ reaction to M&A announcements involving large, medium, and small firms during the fifth wave was analysed in depth by Martynova and Renneboog (2011). The authors intensely exploited their 2,419 M&A announcementsʼ 1993– 2001 database to analyse factors affecting takeover announcement returns. They obtained a positive abnormal return of 0.53%, significant at the 1% level, to bidding shareholders. The list of determinants of the announcement returns is extensive, taking into consideration the takeover characteristics, characteristics of the bidding, and the target firms, as well as the legal environment and ownership structure. Regarding the legal environment, the authors separately investigated the market reactions to bidding announcements, which involved companies that belonged to two different corporate governance regimes—the UK and Continental Europe. The authors found that shareholders of UK target firms obtained a higher premium than those of Continental Europe. This is especially true for domestic deals, wherein shareholders of UK targets obtained higher premiums than those of Continental Europe not only on the takeover announcement date, but also over two months prior to the event.

 

These results are consistent with Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog’s (2006) analyses. The latter show that announcements made by bidding firms located in an English, German, or Scandinavian legal origin country returned a significant and positive abnormal return, while French and Socialist legal origin bidding firms did not obtain a significant return. However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) studied 228 M&A announcements of European acquisitions undertaken between 1993 and 2000 for bids higher than US$ 100 million. The authors found a positive bidders’ reaction of 0.7% to announcements, with an announcement effect substantially larger for UK targets than for the Continental European ones. Furthermore, the authors found evidence that bids which involved a UK target returned a higher premium for both the target firm and the bidder. Moreover, bids on German, Austrian, and Swiss targets also showed significant positive returns for the bidding shareholder firm, although lower than in the previous case. Lastly, bids for southern European targets did not return a statistically significant result to the bidding firm.

 

The results obtained two years later by Faccio et al. (2006) only partially supported those obtained by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2006, 2011). The authors studied the role of the listing status of targets in the acquirers’ cumulated abnormal returns for a sample of 4,429 M&A announcements made by Western European companies during 1996–2001. They found that bids for publicly traded targets imply a negative cumulative abnormal return (not significant) to acquiring  stockholders, whereas the stockholders of a privately  held target obtained a positive and significant return. Moreover, the authors found no significance in stock returns for bids made by companies located in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden. Furthermore, taking into account the listing effects, Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011) analysed intra-European deals during  the  fifth  takeover  wave.  The  authors  found  a  positive  and  significant abnormal bidding return for the sample of firms willing to acquire privately held companies, but non-significantly different from zero returns if the target firms were listed.

 

Finally, Campa and Hernando (2004) examined the effect of 262 M&A announcements related to Continental European listed firms, along with the UK and Ireland, from 1998 to 2001.  Contrary to Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2006, 2011), the authors did not find a reaction significance different from zero with respect to the M&A announcements for the bidding firm. Their results contradict those of previous authors, since they did not find any significance for friendly, domestic, or cross-border takeover bids. Their results regarding the relative size effect of the transaction remain unclear.

 

Following the Brown and Warner (1985) method, our hypothesis have been postulated in his null form:

 

 

Hypothesis 1 (H01): Market participants of Eurostoxx 50 companies do not find a mega M&A announcement informative.

 

We should expect to obtain positive abnormal returns (negative) if the announcement is positively (negatively) valuated by investors. Furthermore, we should also obtain increases (decreases) in volatility and the number of shares traded if investors find the information value-relevant, and then, take an investment decision as a consequence, but they assess the information differently among them.

 

3.        Sample selection and Methodology

 

In subsections 3.1 and 3.2, we present the sample and dataset used in this research, along with the method we propose to analyse the existence of differences in investor reaction to M&A announcements based on the legal origin of the acquirer and the target firm.

 

3.1.     Sample selection

 

We obtained abnormal stock returns, volatilities, and trading volumes related to M&A announcements between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2007 of the Eurostoxx 50 stock market index components. The daily adjusted trading data and the number of shares traded was obtained from Thompson Reuters 3000Xtra. Information on acquisition announcement dates and transaction size was collected from Thomson Reuters Knowledge database. Finally, accounting and financial characteristics of bidders, payment method, deal attitude, and industrial sector was collected from S&P Capital IQ.

 

To include a transaction in the study, its value should be greater than US$ 500 million, offering a minimum relative size cut-off as proposed in Healy et al. (1992) and Alexandridis et al. (2017). Our cut-off is relatively higher than the one established in Goergen and Renneboog (2004)—US$ 100 million—or in Faccio et al. (2006)—US$ 5 million—in order to ensure a market reaction to the announcement.

 

We considered confounding effects, and as a consequence, cleaned events for companies announcing more than one deal within the pre-event window established in the ‘Methodology’. After all filters are applied, we are left with a final sample of 42 bidding companies announcing relevant transactions over 88 targets, which sums up to 92 events (see Appendix 1).

 

Both acquirers’ and targets’ firms are initially classified by legal origin following Djankov et al. (2003); that is, English, German, Scandinavian, French or Socialist. Appendix 1 lists the companies and their legal origin grouped as acquirers or targets. Evidently, the number of observations for Scandinavian legal origin does not allow us to perform an analysis by itself, so they have been added to the German legal origin sample.

 

Table 1 presents the number of announcements and total transactions values by year, as well as their statistics. There is some variation in the number of bids, 2007 being the year with the highest number of announcements, along with the 2004 Sanofi- Synthelabo offer for 100% control of Aventis, the highest transaction, by value, for the examined period. Graph 1 illustrates how this transaction raises 2004 to the second position for the period with highest value bid, in total transaction value, following year 2007.

 

Year

Number of deals

Total

Transactions value*

Minimum

Maximum

Average

Standard deviation

2003

11

12,750.69

589.19

1,990.00

1,159.15

491.60

2004

16

100,516.59

511.95

61,000.00

6,282.29

15,184.63

2005

18

88,041.05

500.70

30,720.00

4,891.17

8,200.83

2006

21

91,470.69

516.58

32,030.00

4,355.75

7,383.96

2007

26

102,732.49

500.00

24,260.00

3,951.25

5,425.45

* In million of dollars

Source: own elaboration based on data from Thompson Reuters Knowledge

Table 1. Sample statistics.

Source: own elaboration based on data from Thompson Reuters Knowledge

Graph 1. Number of deals and total transactions value per year

Tables 2 and 3 give information on market capitalisation, book value of Equity, Debt, and Total Assets, as well as the leverage for acquirers and EBIT and Net Income for target firms. We note that acquirers are much bigger than targets in both market terms and book values.

 

Bidders

Market Cap*

Equity book value*

Debt book value*

Total Assets*

Leverage

2003

26.96

21.70

50.73

231.77

0.78

2004

34.29

20.25

45.32

209.09

0.73

2005

40.75

22.70

74.74

271.38

0.76

2006

42.95

23.89

77.43

282.63

0.73

2007

50.68

29.27

72.21

280.67

0.76

*in billions of euros

Source: own elaboration based on data from S&P Capital IQ

Table 2. Sample statistics for acquirer firms

 

 

Targets**

Market Cap*

Equity

book value*

Debt book value*

Total Assets*

EBIT

Net Income

2003

8.74

2.97

1.82

44.38

0.11

-0.40

2004

22.70

15.13

13.47

96.95

3.29

2.09

2005

8.02

5.71

16.80

66.30

0.40

0.05

2006

8.73

4.34

3.91

36.78

0.74

0.63

2007

12.61

4.46

8.83

26.15

0.91

0.65

*in billions of euros

** public targets

Source: own elaboration based on data from S&P Capital IQ.

Table 3. Sample statistics for target firms.

 

Target and acquirers’ firm legal origins are summarised in Graphs 2 and 3. Our acquirers sample is mostly formed by companies located in a French legal origin country (France, Italy, and Spain), followed by German ones.

 

Our sample for targets is geographically more diversified than that of acquirers, since it contains acquisition announcements from target firms of 27 different countries. Once targets are grouped by legal origin, French legal origin targets are found to be predominant, followed by English, German, and Socialist legal origin targets.

Source: own elaboration based on Djankov et al. (2003) classification.

Graph 2. Bids by legal origin.

Source: own elaboration based on Djankov et al. (2003) classification.

Graph 3. Targets by legal origin.

Finally, Table 4 provides a comprehensive description of events. As depicted, our sample mostly constitutes friendly cross-border M&A announcements, paid in cash, wherein the primary strategy is to acquire a same industry target and obtain a majority stake or even 100% control.

Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

%

Announcements

11

16

18

21

26

92  100.00%

 

Targets

Public

5

5

9

7

6

32

34.78%

Private

4

8

6

13

15

46

50.00%

Assets

2

3

3

1

4

13

14.13%

NA

1

1

1.09%

 

Legal origin

Same

5

5

7

10

9

36

39.13%

Different

6

10

10

10

16

52

56.52%

NA

0

1

1

1

1

4

4.35%

 

Deal attitude

Hostile

0

0

1

0

0

1

1.09%

Friendly

8

14

14

18

24

78

84.78%

Friendly to Hostile

0

0

0

1

0

1

1.09%

NA

3

2

3

2

2

12

13.04%

 

Geographical scope

Domestic deals

4

3

4

5

4

20

21.74%

Cross-border deals

7

12

13

16

21

69

75.00%

NA

1

1

1

3

3.26%

 

Payment method

Cash

8

12

12

14

21

67

72.83%

Equity

0

0

3

2

2

7

7.61%

Combinations

0

1

0

1

0

2

2.17%

Assets

0

0

0

1

0

1

1.09%

NA

3

3

3

3

3

15

16.30%

 

Strategy

Focus-same industry

7

12

15

21

23

78

82.61%

Diversification

4

4

3

0

3

14

17.39%

Source: own elaboration based on data from S&P Capital IQ and Djankov et al. (2003) classification.

Table 4. Announcements characteristics.

 

3.2     Methodology

 

We follow the Brown and Warner (1985) event study methodology to assess the short-term wealth effects of the announcements for bidding firms’ stockholders. Abnormal price changes (Beaver, 1968) and trading volumes (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) are investors’ responses to the disclosure of information. We test the aggregate market’s average reaction by testing changes in prices through two different measures: abnormal returns (ARs) and absolute value abnormal returns (AARs). Additionally, we examine the activity of individual investors around M&A announcements by analysing the change in trading volumes. These three indicators of the market reaction to the release of information have been tested by a t-test when the data is normally distributed, and otherwise, by a non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989; Corrado and Zivney, 1992).

 

We compute ARs as the difference between the actual and normal returns, while the latter are defined as the expected returns without conditioning on the event. Expected returns are obtained from the market model. To avoid compensation of positive and negative reactions to acquisition announcements, we also examine stock price volatility measured as the absolute value of abnormal returns. Then, we proceed with the method similar to the ARs. AARs are computed in absolute values, and corrected by the mean value of the pre-event period. Finally, we define abnormal volume (AV) as the number of shares traded on a given day divided by the average shares traded over the pre- and post-event estimation periods.

 

As it is widely used in the literature, we do not limit our research to the day of the event. However, we do additionally examine a five-day event window, starting at day -2 until day +2, and the event day—day 0. Lastly, cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), cumulative average absolute value abnormal returns (CAAARs), and cumulative average abnormal volumes (CAAVs) are all obtained by adding AARs, AAARs, or AAVs across different time intervals within the event window. Appendix 2 describes computations in detail.

 

4.        Results

 

In this section, we focus on the univariate analyses of CAARS, CAAARs, and CAAVs for bidding firms. We first present results obtained for the whole sample (see Table 5), the significance levels are tested according to the t-test for normally distributed samples or the Corrado test, otherwise. Tables 6 to 11 and 13 to 18 have identical structure; they present the investor’s reaction to the announcements when we consider all possible combinations of legal origin of acquirers and targets. Each table shows accumulated results reported for five periods. First, for the accumulated periods of [-2,0] and [0,+2], we analyse for the presence of an information leakage prior to the announcement or a delayed reaction, respectively. Periods [-1,0] and [0,1] give us information on a very short-term anticipated or delayed market reaction. Lastly, for the cumulated period of [-2,2], we summarise the cumulative reaction for the whole analysed period. The results have been tested according to the t- or Wilcoxon test.

 

Table 5 shows that the mean AAR for acquirers is negative (-0.29%) and significant on the day of the event . This is true for both the event day and all accumulated studied periods—the two-days [0, 1] accumulated effect of -0.46%. Thus, investors react negatively to a mega deal announcement, showing a five-day accumulated negative reaction from up to -0.92% and significant at the 0.01 level. This investors reaction coexists with a significant increase in volatility and volume traded on the event day and all accumulated periods. To control for the possibility of a listing effect, we consider the public and private firm in acquirers’ stock returns (not reported). The mean CAARs [-2,2] for acquirers of listed targets is negative (-0.97%) and significant at the 5% level, while the same measure for acquirers of private targets show a negative abnormal return of -0.99% and significant at the 5% level. Our results differ from those derived by Faccio et al. (2006), Martynova and Renneboog (2008), and Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011). These authors also find negative CAARs for acquirers of listed targets, though they are not significant. The authors also report positive and significant returns for acquirers bidding for a non-listed firm.

 

 

 

 

 

Event period

Event day

Event period

Entire period

[-2,0]

[-1,0]

0

[0,1]

[0,2]

[-2,2]

CAARs (%)

-0.55

-0.52

-0.29

-0.46

-0.65

-0.92

p-value a

-2.68***

-3.07***

-2.43**

-2.73***

-3.16***

-3.43***

CAAARs

0.59

0.43

0.32

0.61

0.54

1.12

(%)

p-value b

2.63***

1.71*

2.53**

3.79***

4.76***

4.60***

CAAVs

0.67

0.55

0.45

0.81

1.14

1.36

p-value b

2.11**

2.58**

3.03***

3.14***

3.75***

3.18***

Observations

92

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ

  1. a) t-test
  2. b) Non-parametric test – Corrado test

Table 5 . This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal trading volumes around M&A announcements for the whole sample. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

The results of testing for the influence of legal origin in investors’ reaction are reported in Tables 6–8. Table 6 shows that investors of bidding firms bidding for a different legal origin target obtain a less negative return than investors of firms bidding for a same legal origin target. This reaction aligns with previous research, showing that firms may take advantage from operating in two different legal origin systems (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The results are graphically presented in Graph 4 for the accumulated period [-30, +10].

 

This analysis stands true for four out of five accumulated periods, with the announcement day being the only exception. However, none of the differences is significant for any of the accumulated periods analysed and at any significant level. More notably, subperiod [-2,0] returns an anticipated investor reaction of -1%, significant at the 0.05% level, for companies bidding for targets within the same legal origin.

 

 

 

 

CAARs (%)

Different legal origin

p-value a

Same legal origin

p-value b

Same – different

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

-0.266

0.396

-1.000

0.014**

-0.735

0.199

[-1,0]

-0.309

0.291b

-0.843

0.064*

-0.532

0.335

[0, 1]

-0.504

0.034**

-0.393

0.085*

0.112

0.926

[0, 2]

-0.698

0.037**

-0.582

0.187

-0.115

0.611

[-2, 2]

-0.711

0.077*

-1.234

0.018**

-0.523

0.628

Observations

56

 

36

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ

  1. a) t-test
  2. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank test
  3. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

Table 6. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal returns taking into account bidder and target legal origin. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

Source: own elaboration based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

Graph 4. Bidders’ CAARs while bidding for a same or different legal origin target.

Regarding results for volatility, Table 7 shows an increase in volatility for periods [0,2] and [-2,2] only when bidding for a different legal origin target, although the effects in volatility are greater in some windows for operations with companies from the same legal origin. This is because of the presence of highly biased distributions, and the presence of some outliers prevents us from obtaining a significant result. For the volume analyses, Table 8 show an increase in the number of shares traded at a significance level of 5% for the entire period just when bidding for a same legal origin target.

 

CAAARs (%)

Different legal origin

p-value b

Same legal origin

p-value b

Same – different

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

0.146

0.431

0.277

0.529

0.131

0.675

[-1,0]

0.171

0.711

0.283

0.798

0.113

0.971

[0, 1]

0.211

0.229

0.454

0.271

0.243

0.845

[0, 2]

0.215

0.012**

0.402

0.171

0.187

0.634

[-2, 2]

0.170

0.044**

0.316

0.371

0.146

0.734

Observations

56

 

36

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank test
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

Table 7. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average absolute value abnormal returns taking into account bidder and target legal origin. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

 

CAAVs

Different legal origin

p-value b

Same legal origin

p-value b

Same – different

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

0.180

0.465

0.291

0.174

0.110

0.399

[-1,0]

0.265

0.302

0.292

0.259

0.027

0.604

[0, 1]

0.398

0.188

0.418

0.123

0.019

0.651

[0, 2]

0.353

0.394

0.426

0.051*

0.072

0.350

[-2, 2]

0.223

0.622

0.349

0.048**

0.126

0.208

Observations

56

 

35

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ

  1. a) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank test
  2. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

Table 8. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal volume taking into account bidder and target legal origin. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

Tables 9–11 show CAARs, CAAARs, and CAAVs results obtained when splitting the sample between the two most predominant bidders’ legal origins in our sample— French and German. Table 9 shows that investors of firms belonging to German legal origin obtain more negative returns than investors of French legal origin ones. This result is consistent for four accumulated periods examined, with a significant positive difference at 5% level for French legal origin investors in periods [0,1] (+0.838) and [- 2,2] (1%), and at a 1% level for period [0,2] (+1.18%). Our results, surprisingly, contradict previous evidence that German or Scandinavian legal origin bidders generate a significantly positive announcement effect (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) or with no significant return (Faccio et al. 2006). There is no significant effect for operations where the bidder is from a French legal origin. Our results align with previous literature which reported a lack of significance in stock returns in their analysis of southern European countries (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), French and the EU enlargement legal  origin  countries  (Martynova  and  Renneboog,  2006),  and  some  by-country analyses in Faccio et al. (2006). Regarding the results in Table 10 on the CAAARs, there is a significant and positive increase in volatility when the bidder is from German legal origin. Contrary to the results obtained for volatility, abnormal and positive volume of shares traded is obtained from the French legal origin subsample (see Table 11) for all accumulated periods. Notwithstanding, none of the differences are significant at any level.

 

CAARs (%)

Bidder French legal origin

p-value b

Bidder German legal origin

p-value a

French – German

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

-0.425

0.111

-0.786

0.123

0.361

0.360

[-1,0]

-0.370

0.284

-0.718

0.098*

0.348

0.243c

[0, 1]

-0.207

0.312

-1.045

0.002***

0.838

0.018**

[0, 2]

-0.309

0.353

-1.489

0.001***

1.180

0.008***

[-2, 2]

-0.587

0.183

-1.588

0.0098***

1.000

0.022**

Observations

63

 

26

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ

  1. a) t-tes
  2. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes

c)Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction.

Table 9. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

 

 

 

 

CAAARs (%)

Bidder French legal origin

p-value b

Bidder German legal origin

p-value b

French -German

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

0.185

0.674

0.140

0.565

0.045

0.525

[-1,0]

0.186

0.937

0.206

0.532

-0.021

0.573

[0, 1]

0.310

0.449

0.304

0.165

0.006

0.254

[0, 2]

0.288

0.152

0.272

0.014**

0.016

0.212

[-2, 2]

0.222

0.293

0.170

0.059*

0.052

0.374

Observations

63

 

26

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 10. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average absolute value abnormal return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

CAAVs

Bidder French legal origin

p-value b

Bidder German legal origin

p-value b

French – German

p-value on difference c

[-2,0]

0.257

0.097*

0.131

0.727

0.126

0.205

[-1,0]

0.325

0.067*

0.169

0.822

0.155

0.218

[0, 1]

0.453

0.027**

0.330

0.653

0.123

0.350

[0, 2]

0.466

0.026**

0.220

0.708

0.245

0.281

[-2, 2]

0.334

0.036**

0.138

0.727

0.196

0.261

Observations

63

 

26

   

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 11. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal volume taking into account the legal origin of the bidder. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

We have checked the composition of our two samples for several determinants of price reaction. Table 12 presents the percentage of big and small relative size transactions (relative size of the target out of the bidder’s size, small relative size transactions compute for the number of transactions at the last tercil, and big relative size transactions at the highest tercil, while transactions have been sorted from the highest relative size to the lowest), type of acquisition (full bid, majority, or minority stake), strategy (concentration, diversification), and cross-border or domestic. As almost all transactions are friendly and paid in cash, we do not consider them as price determinant. As is evident, samples do not differ much in composition.

 

 

French

 

German

 

Price determinants

Observations

%

Observations

%

Small relative size

16

25.40%

10

38.46%

Big relative size

24

38.10%

5

19.23%

Minority stake

15

23.81%

2

7.69%

Majority stake

25

39.68%

16

61.54%

Full bid

15

23.81%

4

15.38%

Concentration

53

84.13%

22

84.62%

Diversification

10

15.87%

4

15.38%

Domestic

16

25.40%

4

15.38%

Cross-border

46

73.02%

21

80.77%

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

Table 12: Bids characteristics of French and German legal origin sample

 

Tables 13–18 summarise the bidder firm’s investors’ reaction taking into account both the bidders’ (French or German) and targets’ legal origin (French, English, German, or Socialist). More notably, the sample sizes are extremely small. Tables 13–15 show CAARs, CAAARS, and CAAVs results for French legal origin bidders and English, German, or Socialist targets. Table 9 shows no abnormal returns of French legal origin investors to the announcements, and this result remains the same (see Table 13) even if we split our French legal origin sample by the target’s legal origin (there is a significant difference at the 10% level when bidding for a Socialist target, probably due to multiple testing problem). This is partially contrary to results obtained by Goergen and Renneboog (2004). The authors found a significant and positive higher premium for bids from a UK and German target, although the latter was not as high as the former.

 

With regard to volatility, Table 14 shows that bidding for a German legal origin company creates controversy among French legal origin investors, since we obtained significant increases in volatility in all periods for this specific subsample. No significance or even less than average volatilities are obtained for English or Socialist subsamples. This increase in volatility is also accompanied by an increase in the number of shares traded for English and German targets subsample, as shown in Table 15. Increases in volatility and volume traded indicate that investors find the announcement adequately value-relevant in order to make investment decisions on their portfolio according to their beliefs. Compensation among positive and negative abnormal returns does not allow appreciating the existence of investors’ reaction; therefore, the inclusion in the analyses of volatility and traded volume is crucial.

 

CAARs (%)

Bidder French Target English

p-value a

Bidder French Target German

p-value a

Bidder French Target Socialist

p-value a

[-2,0]

0.564

0.330

-0.421

0.585

-0.928

0.222

[-1,0]

0.363

0.417

-0.229

0.717

-0.436

0.073*

[0, 1]

-0.545

0.259

0.816

0.297

0.187

0.647

[0, 2]

-0.789

0.194

1.020

0.470

0.124

0.754

[-2, 2]

-0.350

0.940 b

0.681

0.635

-0.730

0.398

Observations

16

 

8

 

6

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. a) t-tes
  2. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 13. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

CAAARs (%)

Bidder French Target English

p-value b

Bidder French Target German

p-value b

Bidder French Target Socialist

p-value b

[-2,0]

0.062

1.000

0.358

0.008***

-0.16

0.438

[-1,0]

0.085

0.980

0.416

0.008**

-0.372

0.031**

[0, 1]

0.151

0.900

0.426

0.055*

-0.280

0.063*

[0, 2]

0.101

0.669

0.481

0.055*

-0.134

0.156

[-2, 2]

0.080

0.744

0.397

0.039**

-0.097

0.438

Observations

16

 

8

 

6

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 14. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal absolute value return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

CAAVs

Bidder French Target English

p-value b

Bidder French Target German

p-value b

Bidder French Target Socialist

p-value b

[-2,0]

0.297

0.093*

0.362

0.641

-0.210

0.156

[-1,0]

0.432

0.046**

0.604

0.094*

-0.272

0.094*

[0, 1]

0.605

0.052*

0.822

0.052*

-0.322

0.031**

[0, 2]

0.566

0.074*

0.964

0.250

-0.325

0.031**

[-2, 2]

0.410

0.066*

0.558

0.313

-0.291

0.031**

Observations

16

 

8

 

6

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 15. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal volume taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

Table 16 shows that German legal origin investors obtain an even more negative return when the firm is bidding for an English target–up to -1.78% for the period [0,2]–or a Socialist target (-1.80% for the entire period). This return does not go along with increases in volatility (see Table 17), and volume traded does not increase either (see Table 18) beyond marginal results at the 10% significance level.

 

CAARs (%)

Bidder German Target English

p-value a

Bidder German Target French

p-value a

Bidder German Target Socialist

p-value a

Event window

%

 

%

 

%

 

[-2,0]

-1.171

0.149

0.583

0.749

-0.046

0.953

[-1,0]

-1.251

0.070*

-0.095

0.953

0.202

0.792

[0, 1]

-1.262

0.0061***

-0.743

0.570

-1.022

0.179

[0, 2]

-1.784

0.0067***

-0.835

0.574

-1.597

0.081*

[-2, 2]

-1.718

0.015**

0.195

0.932

-1.808

0.037**

Observations

10

 

5

 

5

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. a) t-tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 16. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

 

CAAARs (%)

Bidder German Target English

p-value b

Bidder German Target French

p-value b

Bidder German Target Socialist

p-value b

Event window

%

 

%

 

%

 

[-2,0]

0.161

0.846

0.479

0.188

-0.144

0.313

[-1,0]

0.268

0.846

0.554

0.438

-0.043

1.000

[0, 1]

0.342

0.846

0.425

0.313

0.333

0.813

[0, 2]

0.341

0.084*

0.276

0.188

0.376

0.313

[-2, 2]

0.194

0.084*

0.241

0.313

0.173

0.625

Observations

10

 

5

 

5

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tes
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 17. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal absolute value return taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

CAAVs

Bidder German Target English

p-value b

Bidder German Target French

p-value b

Bidder German Target Socialist

p-value b

[-2,0]

-0.102

0.864

0.864

0.156

-0.126

0.125

[-1,0]

-0.105

0.275

1.072

0.156

-0.106

0.313

[0, 1]

0.001

0.695

1.550

0.094*

-0.066

0.813

[0, 2]

-0.039

0.625

1.083

0.094*

-0.028

0.813

[-2, 2]

-0.093

0.160

0.824

0.156

-0.067

0.813

Observations

10

 

5

 

5

 

Source: own calculations based on data from Thomson Reuters 3000Xtra and S&P Capital IQ.

  1. b) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon signed rank tet
  2. c) Non-parametric test – Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correc

Table 18. This table summarizes bidder firms’ accumulated average abnormal volume taking into account the legal origin of the bidder and the target. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.

 

 

 

 

 

Table 19 presents a summary of the reactions.

 

Bidder legal origin

Abnormal returns

Abnormal volatilitie s

Abnormal volume

Target legal origin

Abnormal returns

Abnormal volatilities

Abnormal volume

TOTAL SAMPLE

YES (-)

YES (+)

YES (+)

French

NO

NO

YES (+)

English

NO

NO

YES

German

NO

YES (+)

SOME

Socialist

NO

SOME

NO

Germany

YES (-)

SOME (+)

NO

English

YES (-)

SOME (+)

NO

French

NO

NO

SOME (+)

Socialist

SOME (-)

NO

NO

         

Source: own elaboration

Table 19. Market reaction to mega M&As announcements.

 

5.        Final remarks

 

This paper analyses investors’ short-term reaction to mega merger and acquisition announcements during the sixth merger wave in Continental Europe. We also analyse the effect of legal origin on this reaction.

 

Our main result is a short-term negative abnormal return for the bidder stockholders’ firms as a consequence of the announcement, which contradicts previous evidence from the fifth merger wave in Continental Europe. This reaction is also accompanied with a significant above average level of market volatility and volume traded, thus indicating a strong controversy to market participants. Considering the listing effects on returns, we find that both bids for listed or unlisted targets concur in a negative and significant abnormal return. This result also contradicts previous literature for Continental Europe. A plausible explanation for both negative results for not only the whole sample, but also when considering listed and unlisted targets, may be due to our focus on analysing mega deals. In this scenario, transaction size is a determinant for investors than other factors.

 

When we take into consideration the legal origin of the bidders—French or German— we have been able to determine that the negative return reaction for the whole sample is mostly due to Germans’ legal origin bidders, although they only represent a little less than 30% of the sample. This is because German legal origin bidding firms concentrate the negative return reaction on the announcements—specifically, negative results concentrate on bids over English and Socialist legal origin target. Moreover, French legal origin bidders do not seem to react, since abnormal returns are not significant. Widening the analysis of French legal origin bidders, we also see that stockholders react with an increase in volatilities and the number of shares traded when bidding for a German legal origin target. Hence, for French legal origin investors, a mega deal announcement embodies sufficient information to decide on its portfolio, but it only can be seen as enhancing the frame of analysis for volatility and volume traded.

 

We would like to deepen our analysis by considering more variables, particularly target characteristics that could also determine investor reactions. However, the size of our sample does not allow such an analysis; otherwise, by increasing the number of observations through establishing our cut off at a lower transaction value may not reflect purely the stockholders’ reaction to a mega transaction.

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APPENDIX 1: ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS

 

 

Acquirers

Acquirer Country

 

 

Legal Origin

Anheuser-Busch Inbev

 

Nokia

Belgium

 

Finland

French

 

Scandinavian

Air Liquide Axa

BNP Paribas Carrefour

France Telecom

France France France France

France

French French French French

French

Gaz de France L’Oreal

Saint Gobain

 

Sanofi

France France France

France

French French French

French

Schneider Electric Societe Generale Unibail

Vinci

France France France

France

French French French

French

Vivendi Allianz

Bayer Schering

 

Daimler

France Germany Germany

Germany

French German German

German

Deutsche Bank Deutsche Borse Deutsche Telekom

E.ON

Germany Germany Germany

Germany

German German German

German

Munich Re RWE

SAP

 

Siemens

Germany Germany Germany

Germany

German German German

German

CRH

Assicurazioni Generali Enel

Ireland

Italy Italy

English French

French

 

ENI

 

Intesa Sanpaolo

Italy

 

Italy

French

 

French

Telecom Italia Unicredit ArcelorMittal

ING

Italy Italy Luxembourg

Netherlands

French French French

French

Koninklijke Philips Electronics Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Banco Santander Central Hispano

Iberdrola

Netherlands

Spain Spain Spain

French French French

French

Repsol YPF

 

Telefonica

Spain

 

Spain

French

 

French

 

 

 

Targets                                                                                 Target Country   Legal Origin

 

City Sued Shopping Center                                                     Austria     German Atacadao Distribuicao Comercio e Industria Limitada                                       Brazil            French

TIM Celular                                                                                        Brazil            French

Telefonica Movil Chile                                                                       Chile            French

 

China Citic Bank                                                                                China          Socialist

 

Maurel et Prom’s assets in Congo                                                     Congo            French

 

AGF Assurances                                                                               France            French

 

Autoroutes du Sud de la France                                                        France            French

 

Aventis                                                                                              France            French

 

Cofiroute                                                                                           France            French

 

Industrial Turbines Business of Alstom                                            France            French

 

Pinault Bois et Materiaux                                                                  France              French

Office Properties in Paris and Brussels                                            Belgium            French

Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank                                                Germany          German

DaimlerChrysler Luft- und Raumfahrt Holding                             Germany          German

Gabriel Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Brau                                Germany          German

Messer Griesheim GmbH’s gas operations                                   Germany          German

 

Norisbank                                                                                      Germany          German

 

Saar Ferngas            

 

Schering

Germany

 

Germany

German

 

German

STADTWERKE LEIPZIG

 

Ghana Telecom

MOL Foldgaztaralo Rt MOL Storage 2S Banca

Germany

 

Ghana Hungary

Italy

German English Socialist

French

Assicurazioni Generali Banca Nazionale del Lavoro CAAM SGR

Capitalia

Italy Italy Italy

Italy

French French French

French

Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s (MPS’s) bankassurance

 

and pension operations

 

 

Italy

 

 

French

Olimpia

 

Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta

Italy

 

Italy

French

 

French

Telecom Italia Mobile Toro Assicurazioni Unicredito Italiano

Wind Telecomunicazioni

Italy

Italy

French French French

French

Arcelor

 

Quilmes Industrial

Grupo Financiero BBVA Bancomer S A de C V Euronext

Luxembourg Luxembourg

Mexico

 

Netherlands

French French French

French

Orange Nederland Rodamco

Zentiva

 

TeleRing

Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands

Norway

French French French

Scandinavian

Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa

 

SECIL Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento Electrica Muntenia Sud

OGK-4

 

RESO-Garantiya

Poland Portugal Romania Russia

Russia

Socialist French Socialist Socialist

Socialist

Severneftegazprom

 

United Financial Group

Russia

 

Russia

Socialist

 

Socialist

 

Orange Slovensko

 

Slovenske Elektrarne

Slovakia

 

Slovakia

Socialist

 

Socialist

Compania Espanola de Petroleos Endesa

Terra Lycos

 

Terra Networks

Spain

Spain

French French French

French

Wind Farms in Spain and Italy Dahl International

Winterthur Swiss Insurance

 

TMB Bank

Spain/Italy Sweden Switzerland

Thailand

French Scandinavian

German

 

English

Tupras Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri Avent Holdings

Body Shop International

 

BPB

Turkey

UK

French English English

English

Burren Energy Caledonia Oil and Gas Four Seasons Healthcare

London Stock Exchange

UK

UK

English English English

English

O2

 

BMG Music Publishing Group Drive Financial

Energy East Corp

UK  US

US

English English English

English

Excelerate Energy

GMAC Commercial Mortgage GSM Network of Cingular Laredo National Bancshares

US

US

English English English

English

Lumileds Lighting MONY Group NAVTEQ Corp OutlookSoft

Pelco

US

US

English English English English

English

Retek

 

Shenzi Deep Water Oil Field

US

 

US

English

 

English

 

Sovereign Bancorp

 

Ashland Global Holdings

US

 

US

English

 

English

128 Commercial properties Midland

Non-Listed capital risk assets

NA NA

NA

NA NA

NA

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 2: ABNORMAL RETURN AND VOLUME CALCULATIONS

Abnormal return

 

The return of security i over period t is defined as:

 

Rit = E(Rit | Xt)it + ARit              [1]

 

where, Rit , E(Rit|Xt)it and ARit are  the  actual, normal, and abnormal returns, respectively, and Xt is the conditioning information set for the normal return model.

 

We compute expected or normal returns by using the market model, thus we assume that normal return is given by a linear relationship between the stock and the market return.

𝐸(𝑅$% |𝑋%)$% = 𝑎$ +

𝑏$                                                                                                                                                                 𝑅.%                                                                                                                                                                                  [2]

 

Where:

𝑅.%  =

𝑙1 234567588 9: ;75<= >?4=@7 ABC@8 D   G                                                             [3]

234567588 9: ;75<= >?4=@7 ABC@8 DEF

 

 

We estimate the security normal returns through a pre-event period of 151 days starting on day -170 to day -20 been day 0 the M&A announcement date.

Average abnormal returns (AARs) has been obtain averaging abnormal returns of each event. Thus, AARs is calculated as:

 

 

Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) has been calculated by adding the average daily abnormal return for different time intervals (a, b), within the event window [-2, +2].

Absolute Abnormal Return

 

Absolute abnormal returns has been obtain applying the absolute value of each abnormal return. Then, we proceed averaging them, thus AAAR is given by:

Cumulative average absolute abnormal return (CAAAR) is obtained by adding average daily absolute abnormal returns across different time intervals (a, b), within the event window [-2, +2].

 

Abnormal Volume

 

Following Menendez (2005), we define abnormal trading volumes for stock i on day t as:

Once abnormal daily volumes have been computed for each firm, the average abnormal trading volume (AAV) on day t is calculated as:

The cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) is obtained by adding average daily abnormal volumes across different time intervals (a, b), within the event window [-2,+2].

 

 

 

                         

[FULL] Article 1, Volume 4 Issue 2

The influence of absorptive capacity, sources of information and technological acquisition in the technological innovation breadth of manufacturing companies

Author

Javier Del Carpio Gallegos

Jhony Ostos Mariño

Kerstin Bremser

Abstract

This article is an approach to new definitions of materiality as applied to corporate performance and disclosure practices. Over time, the materiality lens will have implications for multiple operating areas. They will range from; risk and compliance to strategy setting, corporate policy and governance, management practices including stakeholder engagement, and even human resource management. In the second part there is a presentation of the definitions, scope and perspectives of materiality according to six relevant standard-setters in the field of sustainability reporting. Finally there is the presentation of how materiality is reported according to the six biggest groups of quoted companies in Spain.

Keywords

1.        Introduction

In terms of the relationship between research and development (R & D) and innovation, the literature tends to focus its attention on high technology manufacturing companies. However, there are manufacturing companies who achieve innovations in their products and processes that are not related to specific R & D activities (Santamaría, Nieto, & Barge-Gil, 2009). It is just as important to analyze the behavior of these low and medium low technology (low- and medium-low-tech) companies due to their contribution to the growth of the economies in which they participate, the number of jobs they contribute, and the innovations introduced into the market (Heidenreich, Hirsch‐Kreinsen, & Jacobson, 2008). As such, low-tech companies remain central to the economic welfare of many. When measured in terms of results or capital invested, they dominate the economies of highly developed nations as well as developing countries, providing more than ninety percent of the gross product of the European Union, the United States and Japan (Robertson, Smith, & Von Tunzelmann, 2009). Moreover, Krammer (2016) notes that “some of these mature industries still exhibit significant technology sales among leading companies, but more importantly, they form the backbone of all the economies in the world. Thus, understanding the motivation and benefits of such interactions can provide important lessons for policy-making for both developed and developing nations, where mature industries are still responsible for a considerable share of GDP and employment”.

Thus, this article seeks to better understand the importance of low– and medium-low-tech company performance by setting the following objectives:

  • To show how the absorptive capacity of low- and medium-low-tech companies influences the company’s technological innovation breadth,
  • To analyze how the importance of sources of information from customers, suppliers, consultants, and technology transfer institutes help low- and medium-low-tech companies to improve their technological innovation breadth, and
  • To show how the acquisition of machinery, hardware and software helps to improve the technological innovation breadth.

To meet these objectives the article proceeds as follows. Next, the authors provide a short background section, which identifies the study’s key concepts and variables. Then, it follows a section that develops the study’s hypotheses in greater detail. Besides, it is identified the data used for the study and methods for analysis. Next, the authors provide the study’s results indicating significance and hypothesis acceptance. Later, it is presented a discussion of the results and the relevance of these to further our undestanding of low- and medium-low-tech company innovation. Finally, closing the article with a short conclusion.

2.        Background of the study

In the following section, the authors present the basic concepts related to the variables of studies such as industries of low- and medium-low tech intensity, absorptive capacity, sources of information, technological acquisition, and company performance, leading onto hypothesis definition.

The level of technology intensity of an industry is able to be determined and used to classify an industry as low- and medium-low-tech. Kirner, Kinkel, & Jaeger (2009) classified firms according a measure calculated by dividing internal research and development spending sales over a particular year. Their analysis established three categories: (1) high technological intensity, which were those companies with a had an indicator greater than 7%; (2) medium technological intensity, which were those companies whose indicator is between 2.5% and 7%; and (3) low-technology companies which are those with an indicator of less than 2.5%. Heidenreich (2009) conducted a study based on the fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) and found that companies belonging to the group of low- and medium-intensity technology industries tend to be characterized by innovation, which is concerned more with processes, organizing or marketing, while having a high dependence on the external supply of technologies in the form of machines, equipment and software. The role of formal and informal knowledge among companies has also been determined to be important for industries of low or medium technological intensity, as these industries have been found to learn beyond those activities directly related to research and development ((Sciascia, D’Oria, Bruni, & Larrañeta, 2014); (Santamaría et al., 2009); (Jacobson & Heanue, 2005)).

Absorptive capacity is one of the constructs that has had a great impact on the research of organizations. The development of different models of absorptive capacity has been due to the fact that the construct has attracted the interest of a great number of researchers due to the influence of the absorptive capacity in the development of competitive advantages and the performance of the company (Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). Cohen & Levinthal (1990) point out that the absorptive capacity is the ability of the company to recognize the value of new and external information, to assimilate it and to apply it for commercial purposes and for its critical innovative capabilities. Then, Zahra & George (2002) propose a new model of absorptive capacity, indicating that it is a multidimensional construct. In this regard, they point out that there are four dimensions that make up the absorptive capacity of the company: Acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation. Subsequently, Todorova & Durisin (2007) criticize the work of Zahra & George (2002) noting that the development of the absorptive capacity is a process of path dependence, and that the increase of the knowledge in the area of ​​the experience driving the future development of capabilities.

Organizations gain knowledge through the interaction of internal and external sources of information (Laursen & Salter, 2006). This external knowledge comes a range of West & Bogers (2014), with specific sources of external knowledge being suppliers (Li & Vanhaverbeke, 2009), customers (Grimpe & Sofka, 2009), competitors (Lim, Chesbrough, & Ruan, 2010), or universities (Fabrizio, 2009). While companies that use external and internal sources improve their innovative performance, the combined effect of these sources of knowledge is often not very clear (Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009).

According to a study carried out by Arbussa & Coenders (2007) on mechanism that companies carry out to contribut to an improvement of their innovative capacityis to acquire machinery, equipment and hardware. Similarly, Frank, Cortimiglia, Ribeiro, & De Oliveira, (2016) research on innovation in Brazil, noted that the purchase of machinery and equipment improves the results of innovation and processes in companies.

The technological innovation breadth, according to Gronum, Verreynne, & Kastelle, (2012) is the result of combining responses from companies that have introduced a new or improved product or service or a new or improved process over the past three years.

3.        Hypothesis

3.1.     Absorptive capacity and technological innovation breadth.

The influence of absorptive capacity on innovation has been the subject of several investigations. Cohen & Levinthal (1990) argued that the absorptive capacity is very important for the innovation process of the company, because it increases the speed and frequency of innovation. Innovations are therefore, primarily based on the firm’s knowledge base (Kim & Kogut, 1996). Similarly, Zahra & George (2002) found a significant positive relationship between absorptive capacity and innovation, as these factors work together to establish the competitive advantage of the organization. This argument is supported by the empirical study of Knudsen & Roman (2004), who also suggest that absorptive capacity is an important factor in predicting an organization’s capacity for innovation.

Caloghirou, Kastelli, & Tsakanikas (2004) investigated the extent to which the existing internal capabilities of firms and their interaction with external sources of knowledge affect their level of innovation. The findings of their research show that some capacities result from a protracted process of investment and accumulation of knowledge within companies and form what has been treated as the absorptive capacity of companies. In addition, the results show that both internal capabilities and openness to knowledge sharing are important for improving innovative performance. Wang & Han (2011) carried out a study on SMEs in China, that validated knowledge properties and absorptive capacity as two inseparable determinants of innovation performance, while indicating that absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between the properties of knowledge and the performance of innovation. Ali & Park (2016) developed a study of 195 Korean companies of various sizes and sectors, in which they validated that absorptive capacity is crucial to the organization’s innovation and performance.

It is also important to mention that Ince, Imamoglu, & Turkcan (2016) developed a theoretical model, which holds that absorptive capacity has a positive impact on technological innovation capacities and both together have a positive impact on innovation.

In this sense the following hypothesis can be proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Absorptive capacity improves the technological innovation breadth in companies

3.2.     Sources of information and technological innovation breadth

It is clear that firms can improve their ability to innovate by carefully managing information that comes from relationships with suppliers, customers, and other resource providers, such as universities or government agencies (Kaufman, McAndrews, & Wang, 2000). Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza (2001) consider that the acquisition of customer knowledge shows a positive influence on product innovation. In this sense, customers, as well as suppliers, can play an important role in the innovation process as they contribute to providing key information on technologies, markets and user needs (Díaz-Díaz & De Saá-Peréz, 2007). While some innovative firms may devote little financial resources to formal R & D activities, they achieve successful innovations due to the use of knowledge and applying experience of a wide range of external sources of information (Laursen & Salter, 2006). Wu, Lin, & Hsu (2007) found there to be a positive relationship, in which relations with customers and suppliers and product innovation appear to complement each other as firms acquire and apply external knowledge and skills. From the perspective of open innovation, the knowledge of an organization’s sources of information customers and suppliers is therefore related to technological innovation of products and processes and, consequently, of business’s success. On the basis of such arguments Delgado, De Castro, Navas, & Cruz (2011), applied this complimentary perspective of knowledge to a sample of 251 Spanish companies in the manufacturing sector. The results provided empirical evidence on the influence of knowledge sources on innovation. The results reflected the important role of sources of information on product and/or process innovation, highlighting in greater measure the interorganizational relations maintained by the company, with its customers and suppliers.

Based on the above, the following hypothesis can be considered:

Hypothesis 2: Sources of information are important to improvement of the technological innovation breadth of companies

3.3.     Technological acquisition and technological innovation breadth

Calvo (2000) argue that, in 1998, innovative companies in Spain not only invested significant R & D shares, but also in the acquisition of machinery, the purchase of intangible technology, training and marketing. Therefore, we can say that they diversified their expenses in several activities.

Ahuja & Katila (2001), it is important to clarify that it is not enough to acquire technology to increase innovation, but also to evaluate its impact, favorable or not, on innovation production. The benefits that can be received will depend on the number and nature of the knowledge elements that will be offered to the company that acquires them. Consideration should therefore be given to the statement by Calantone, Cavusgil, & Zhao (2002) that “Innovative capacity is one of the most important determinants of company performance”. In this sense, it could be assumed that if the acquisition of machinery, hardware, and software improves the company’s innovative capacity this will improve the performance of the company. It can be assumed that the purchase of technological assets is a contribution to the improved performance of the company. Potters (2009) states that in order to implement new or improved products or processes, ie innovation activities, the purchase of machinery and equipment is required. Among advanced machinery, we have, for example, computer hardware, which is needed for the processes and products mentioned. This technology can be used directly because it is already incorporated in the equipment and machinery. As Santamaría et al. (2009) point out not only are the R & D activities a source of innovation for the company but also the other types of activities including knowledge and experience gained from the use of advanced machinery and tools, which has been found to be a source of innovation for low- and medium-low-tech intensity companies. Huang, Arundel, & Hollanders (2011) cite Pavitt (1984) to indicate that industrial sectors that are dominated by suppliers, such as textiles, leather and footwear manufacturers, which are also typical examples of low technology industries, tend to focus on their innovative capacity development efforts through the purchase of advanced machinery and equipment.

Further, Zuniga & Crespi (2013) indicate that innovation strategies to used for are what allow technological product-innovation- and / or process innovationmay consist of: investment in research and development (R & D); the acquisition of technology in the market through R & D contracting, licensing technology and know-how; the contracting of technical and engineering services; and the acquisition of machinery and equipment that favor innovation.

Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: The acquisition of machinery, hardware and software contributes to improve the technological innovation breadth of companies.

4.        Methods

For this empirical study, the authors use the data collected in the National Survey of Innovation in the Manufacturing Industry 2012, a survey applied to the Peruvian manufacturing sector companies to obtain information about their innovation processesdeterminants, obstacles and specific characteristics. This is third time that this survey has been conducted and is considered to have improved representativeness and reliability than previous versions.

The study was carried out in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), National Council of Science, Technology and Technological Innovation (Concytec) and the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). INEI were responsible for data collection financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The survey was designed and developed based on the methodological framework of the “Bogotá Manual”, which allows for comparable indicators and results with other Latin American countries.

The survey was conducted during the reference period 2009-2012 and with a representative sample of 1220 companies, of large, medium and small, across the country’ different regions. As such, the survey is considered to have inference at the national level.

The design of this survey was developed based on the methodological framework of the “Bogotá Manual”, which in turn will allow the elaboration of indicators comparable with the results of other countries in the Latin American region.

 

4.1.     Sample

The development of the national survey allowed to obtain information from companies whose economic activity is included in section C (manufacturing industries), divisions 10 to 33, according to ISIC, revision 4. The survey was carried out in the regions of Lima, Arequipa, La Libertad, Áncash, Ica, Piura, Ucayali, Lambayeque, Junín and San Martín, in which more than 90% of the value of the production of the manufacturing activity at national level is generated. The information obtained from the 1 220 companies surveyed covers the three consecutive years of 2009 to 2011.

 

4.2.     Obtaining the data

According to INEI, responses were obtained through the direct interview, with each informant assigned by the companies considered in the sample. This exercise was carried out from the first days of September until mid-October of 2012 by trained interviewers. The field work resulted in 1,220 questionnaries carried out of which 1,121 were identified as manufacturing companies.

 

4.3.     Conceptual model

Figure 1 shows the conceptual model that relates the three constructs: absorptive capacity, sources of information and technological acquisition with the technological innovation breadth.

Figure 1. Conceptual model (Source: Own illustration).

Analysis and calculations were made by applying the SMART PLS version 3 using three (3) data groups specified by the following criteria, where: specification one includes all companies that participated in the 2012 manufacturing innovation survey, specification two includes only low- and medium-low-tech companies that participated in the 2012 manufacturing innovation survey, and specification three includes only the medium-high and high technology companies that participated in the 2012 manufacturing innovation survey.

4.4.     The measurement of the variables

Below is a description of how absorptive capacity has been measured.

1.1.1   Measurement of absorptive capacity

Absorptive capacity is measured using the proposal of Escribano, Fosfuri, & Tribó, (2009). In this sense, two variables are considered: (1) expenditure on research and technological development activities, both internal and external, and (2) training costs for innovation activities. These data were transformed by applying the logarithm in base 10.

 

1.1.2   Measuring sources of information

In the questionnaire developed by INEI, Chapter VIII asks the respondents about the degree of importance of the sources of information that the company could have used for the development of innovation during the period 2009 to 2011.

The grades of importance were classified with the following criteria: None (1), low (2), medium (3) and high (4).

Table 1 shows the different sources of information:

 

 

Type of source

Source of information

Internal

1

Within the company or group of companies

Market

2

Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software

3

Customers

4

Competitors

5

Consultants, commercial laboratories or private institutes of I +D

Institutional

6

Universities or other research centers

7

Government or public institutes

Other

8

Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions

9

Scientific journals and technical trade publications

10

Professional and sectoral associations

11

Internet access

12

Other specify

Table 1. Different sources of information (Source: Based on INEI Survey 2012, own illustration)

 

Of these, the following sources of information were considered for the analysis: suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software; consultants, commercial laboratories or private R & D institutes; conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions; scientific journals and technical trade publications; and professional and sectoral associations because they have a greater explanation in technological innovation.

 

1.1.3   Measurement of technological acquisition

The technological acquisition has been measured with the following variables:

The acquisition of capital machinery, i.e. the incorporation of machinery, tools or buildings linked to the introduction of improvements and / or innovations of products (goods or services), processes, organizational techniques and / or marketing (INEI Survey, 2012).

The acquisition of hardware, i.e. the acquisition, outsourcing or leasing of hardware specifically designed to introduce changes in products (goods or services), processes, organizational techniques and / or marketing (INEI Survey, 2012).

The acquisition of software, i.e. the acquisition or leasing of software specifically designed to introduce changes in products (goods or services), processes, organizational techniques and / or marketing (INEI Survey, 2012).

These data were transformed by applying the logarithm in base 10.

 

1.1.4   The measurement of the technological innovation breadth of the company

The measurement of the technological innovation breadth of the company is measured by the answers obtained from the following questions that have been formulated in the Innovation questionnaire (INEI Survey, 2012), which is presented in Table 2.

 

Type of innovation

In the years 2009-2011 the company was able to introduce or incorporate a:

Innovation in product

1.       Good new?

2.       New service?

3.       Well significantly improved?

4.       Significantly improved service?

Innovation in process

5.       New process?

6.       Significantly improved process?

Table 2. Technological innovation of product and process (Source: Based on INEI Survey 2012, own illustration)

 

The answers are dichotomous, where if the answer is YES the value will be 1, and if the answer is NO the value will be 0. The value of the variable diversity of innovation will be the result of adding the answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

5.        Results

5.1.     Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 provides respondent demographic characteristics: Age of the company (in years), number of employees and annual sales (thousands of Nuevos Soles). In total, there are 1121 manufacturing companies used for analysis; because there are companies with missing values that do not contribute to the study.

 

 

 

Demographics

Frequencies

Age of company (in years)

[6-10]

217

[11-15]

232

[16-20]

206

>20

466

Total

1121

Number of employees

<=50

648

[51-250]

250

>250

226

Total

1121

Annual sales (thousands of soles)

 

<=540

53

<540-6120]

499

<6120-8280]

53

>8280

516

Total

1121

Table 3. Demographic Characteristics (Based on INEI Survey 2012, own compilations).

 

The descriptive statistics and correlations of the 3 specifications are shown (see Annex 8.5); specification 1 which include all enterprises in the data processing, specification 2 which only considers low- and medium-low-tech enterprises and specification 3, which only considers medium-high and high-end enterprises technological intensity. Correlation analysis serves to measure the strength or degree of correlation between the variables under study, according to Bernal (2010). A criterion for assessing whether this explanatory capacity is low, medium or high is to take the values 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 respectively, which offers as referents Cohen J. (1988). According to the study, the correlations of the measurable variables in each latent variable in the different specifications are above 0.3; indicating that there is a mean and high correlation within each latent variable. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider expenditures on research and technological development, and training costs for innovation activities in the latent variable Absorptive Capacity (ACAP); equipment and software suppliers, private consultants and institutes, conferences and exhibitions, scientific magazines, and professional associations in the latent variable Sources of Information (SOI); acquisition of capital machinery, acquisitions of hardware and acquisition of software in the latent variable Technological Acquisition (TECHNOLOGY).

 

5.2.     Measurement model

The measurement model requires that the following indicators be checked:

  • The reliability of the model using Cronbach’s alpha and the composite reliability index whose values must be greater than 0.7 (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, & Ringle, 2012).
  • Convergent validity using AVE (average variance extracted) whose value must be greater than 0.5 (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009).
  • Multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicator whose reference value should be less than 5 (Hair et al., 2012).
  • Discriminant validity by comparing the square root of AVE and correlations between variables. To verify the discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE must be greater than the correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

It can be seen that, for all specifications using the composite reliability index, the minimum requirement of 0.7 is exceeded, which is not the case with Cronbach’s alpha, which rarely exceeds the reference value; while for all specifications it can be seen that multicollinearity is controlled, with values lower than 5. When it is analyzed the convergent validity using AVE must be greater than 0.5; in most cases the condition is satisfies, however there is only one case in the third specification for the construct Source of Information the AVE is 0.491 almost 0.5. Also, when the discriminante validity is analyzed; in all the cases the square root of the AVE is greater than correlations. Therefore, the measurements models can be accepted. Tables 4, 6 and 8 present the indicators of validity, reliability, coefficient of determination and multicollinearity for the three specifications, while tables 5, 7 and 9 provides discriminant validity data for each specification measurement model.

 

 

 

 

 

Latent variable

Description of item

Item Loadings

Cronbach´s alpha

Composite Reliability (CR)

AVE

VIF

 

Absorptive capacity (ACAP)

Expenditure on research and technological development.

0.869

0.646

0.850

0.739

1.508

0.454

Training costs for innovation activities.

0.850

Sources of Information (SOI)

Equipment and software suppliers

0.708

0.769

0.839

0.514

1.058

Private consultants and institutes

0.602

Conferences and exhibitions

0.782

Scientific magazines

0.811

Professional associations

0.660

Technological acquisition (TECHNOLOGY)

Acquisition of capital machinery.

0.799

0.718

0.839

0.635

1.494

Acquisition of hardware.

0.819

Acquisition of software.

0.772

Reference value

>0.7

>0.7

>0.5

<5

 

Table 4. Specification one: Indicators of validity, reliability, coefficient of determination and multicollinearity (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

 

 

 

ACAP

Technological Innovation Breadth

FI

TECHNOLOGY

ACAP

0.859

   

Technological Innovation Breadth

0.589

1.00

  

SOI

0.217

0.198

0.717

 

TECHNOLOGY

0.570

0.603

0.195

0.797

Table 5. Specification one: Discriminant validity (Comparison of square root of AVE and correlations) (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

 

 

Latent variable

Description of item

Item Loadings

Cronbach´s alpha

Composite Reliability (CR)

AVE

VIF

 

Absorptive capacity (ACAP)

Expenditure on research and technological development.

0.858

0.630

0.844

0.730

1.511

0.456

Training costs for innovation activities.

0.851

Sources of Information (SOI)

Equipment and software suppliers

0.738

0.775

0.842

0.519

1.066

Private consultants and institutes

0.586

Conferences and exhibitions

0.790

Scientific magazines

0.806

Professional associations

0.656

Technological acquisition (TECHNOLOGY)

Acquisition of capital machinery.

0.790

0.701

0.831

0.622

1.500

Acquisition of hardware.

0.813

Acquisition of software.

0.762

Reference value

>0.7

>0.7

>0.5

<5

 

Table 6. Specification two: Indicators of validity, reliability, coefficient of determination and multicollinearity (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

 

ACAP

Technological Innovation Breadth

FI

TECHNOLOGY

ACAP

0.854

   

Technological Innovation Breadth

0.581

1.00

  

SOI

0.227

0.216

0.720

 

TECHNOLOGY

0.571

0.611

0.212

0.789

Table 7. Specification two: Discriminant validity (Comparison of square root of AVE and correlations) (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations).

 

 

 

 

Latent variable

Description of item

Item Loadings

Cronbach´s alpha

Composite Reliability (CR)

AVE

VIF

 

Absorptive capacity (ACAP)

Expenditure on research and technological development.

0.895

0.693

0.866

0.764

1.513

0.451

Training costs for innovation activities.

0.853

Sources of Information (SOI)

Equipment and software suppliers

0.560

0.746

0.826

0.491

1.040

Private consultants and institutes

0.673

Conferences and exhibitions

0.760

Scientific magazines

0.820

Professional associations

0.662

Technological acquisition (TECHNOLOGY)

Acquisition of capital machinery.

0.828

0.771

0.866

0.682

1.482

Acquisition of hardware.

0.840

Acquisition of software.

0.810

Reference value

>0.7

>0.7

>0.5

<5

 

Table 8. Specification three: Indicators of validity, reliability, coefficient of determination and multicollinearity (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

 

 

ACAP

Technological Innovation Breadth

FI

TECHNOLOGY

ACAP

0.874

   

Technological Innovation Breadth

0.606

1.00

  

SOI

0.194

0.145

0.701

 

TECHNOLOGY

0.570

0.582

0.132

0.826

Table 9. Specification three: Discriminant validity (Comparison of square root of AVE and correlations) (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

5.3.     Structural model

After evaluating the measurement models, we proceed to estimate the structural model by applying the Smart PLS version 3 for each of the 3 specifications, and the results are shown below in table 10 containing the coefficients of the variables and the coefficient of determination.

 

 

All the companies

Low y Low-Medium Tech

High y Medium-High Tech

Absorptive capacity (ACAP)

Coef

0.356

0.337

0.402

P-val

0

0

0

Sources of Information (SOI)

Coef

0.044

0.053

0.021

P-val

0.044

0.036

0.654

Technological acquisition (TECHNOLOGY)

Coef

0.391

0.407

0.350

P-val

0

0

0

Coefficient of determination ()

Coef

0.454

0.456

0.451

P-val

0

0

0

Number of companies

1121

856

265

Table 10. Shows the coefficients of the variables and the coefficient of determination of specifications 1, 2 and 3 (Source: Applying to SMART PLS software, own calculations)

 

As can be seen coefficients for the variables across the specifications are statistically significant at 5% except for specification three’s relationship coefficient between Sources of Information (SOI) and Technological Innovation Breadth. Analysis of the results using, Henseler et al. (2009) coefficient of determination, where values of of 0.19 reflects a weak relation, a value of 0.33 reflects a moderate relation, and a value of 0.67, a substantial relation, infers that the three specifications possess a moderate relationship, with the highest value found for companies of high and medium-high technological intensity. Table 11 shows the analysis of these results with respect to the hypotheses proposed by each model.

 

 

Specification 1

Specification 2

Specification 3

Hypothesis 1

Yes

Yes

Yes

Hypothesis 2

Yes

Yes

No

Hypothesis 3

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 11. Analysis of the hypothesis proposed by each specification (Source: own illustration)

In the specifications one and two all three hypotheses are accepted. However, for specification three, companies of medium-high and high technological intensity, we only accept hypotheses one and three. For this specification, hypothesis two that refers to the sources of information improving the technological innovation breadth is not accepted.

6.         Conclusions

This analysis of low- and medium-low manufacturing companies compared to medium-high and high technological intensity allows us to present the following conclusions:

The development of a company’s absorptive capacity allows manufacturing companies to improve the technological innovation breadth.  The results of the research show that low and medium-low tech companies face medium-high and high technological intensity, evidencing that research and technological development expenses together with training expenses for innovation activities improve the performance of the innovation of the company. In both specifications, these measurable variables are important for improving the breadth of technological innovation.

When comparing the importance of sources of information in low- and medium-low-tech enterprises compared to medium- and medium-high technology companies, it can be seen that in both sectors, the information that comes from of scientific journals and commercial publications allows to improve the technological innovation breadth. On the other hand, there is a difference between the source of information of suppliers and consultants; the suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software have a greater impact on companies of medium-high and high technological intensity; and consultants, commercial laboratories or private R & D institutes, a greater importance in low- and medium-low-tech enterprises.

The acquisition of equipment, machinery, hardware and software has been constituted as the acquisition of incorporade technology that improves the company’ innovative diversity (Huang et al., 2011) and thus contributes to improved company performance. In this sense, companies should selectively increase this type of acquisitions to increase their performance. In the medium-high and high technological intensity companies, a greater importance of the technological acquisition is presented in front of the companies of low and low-medium technological intensity. To be more specific, hardware acquisition has a greater importance in medium-high and high technology companies.

In the implications for researchers, this investigation has been conducted on a sample of manufacturing companies from information obtained in the survey of technological innovation carried out in 2012 by INEI and the Peruvian Ministry of Production.  Three specifications of data were analyzed: (1) all companies, (2) low and medium-low technology companies; and (3) medium-high and high technology companies.

The results verified across the three specifications that absorptive capacity has some influence on the performance of the company supporting Volberda et al. (2010) observation that absorptive capacity improves the technological innovation breadth.

On the other hand, analysis of the degree of importance of sources of information improves the technological innovation breadth, verification was abtained for specifications 1 and 2 and concurs with Frenz & Ietto-Gillies (2009) and Ferreras-Méndez, Newell, Fernández-Mesa, & Alegre (2015) findings. There is an exception with the third specification, consisting of medium-high and high technological intensity companies, rejecting the hypothesis, because other sources of information could improve the technological innovation breadth.

In terms of the role of technological acquisition to improve the technological innovation breadth, this statement was verified for all three specifications. The results are in agreement with Santamaría et al. (2009) finding that companies manage to develop innovations through the acquisition of machinery, equipment and software.

In the implications for researchers, managers may use the results to develop their own innovative capacity. To do this, the three variables used here can be applied: absorptive capacity, access to sources of information and acquisition of machinery, hardware, and software. In terms of the development of the absorptive capacity managers can consider to enhance a firm’s capacity by increasing training costs to improve the skills and knowledge of the workforce to identify or propose process and product innovations. Managers may also consider the company’s expenditure on research and technological development activities, both internal and external, while encouraging the use of external sources of information such as joining associations, subscribing to magazines, attending conferences, and improving engagement with consultants and suppliers. Lastly, managers may seek to improve their acquisition of knowledge and technology through the purchase of machinery and equipment that allows the improvement of the technological innovation breadth of the company.

The survey was conducted in 2012 and asks for information corresponding to the period 2009 to 2011. For this study, we have limited ourselves to analyzing the information corresponding to the year 2011. To improve the analysis and consistency of the hypotheses it would be convenient to analyze information corresponding to future periods.

While the data is considered robust, it is limited in that it lack some context. As such It is suggested that additional research be carried out to gather further characteristics of firms undertaking innovations, or to specify and contrast industrial sectors. Likewise, it may be possible to identify which of the activities of innovation has greater impact in the advancement of products, processes and non-technological innovation.

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ANNEXES

 

Classification of companies according to their technological intensity according to OECD.

 

Figure 2. Classification of the manufacturing companies according to technological intensity (Source: OECD 2011)

 

Classification of manufacturing enterprises according to their technological intensity and according to the two-digit ISIC code.

 

Economic Activity

Division

All companies

The companies of low- and low-medium

The companies of medium-high and high

Manufacture of food products

10

116

116

0

Manufacture of beverages

11

40

40

0

Manufacture of textiles

13

49

49

0

Manufacture of wearing apparel

14

52

52

0

Manufacture of leather and related products

15

30

30

0

Table 12: continued

 

 

 

 

 

Economic Activity

Division

All companies

The companies of low- and low-medium

The companies of medium-high and high

Wood production and manufacture of wood and cork products, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials

16

48

48

0

Manufacture of paper and paper products

17

45

45

0

Printing and playback of recordings

18

36

36

0

Manufacture of coke and products of petroleum refining

19

15

15

0

Manufacture of chemical substances and products

20

57

0

57

Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products for pharmaceutical use

21

30

0

30

Manufacture of rubber and plastic products

22

57

57

0

Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products

23

100

100

0

Manufacture of basic metals

24

104

104

0

Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment

25

50

50

0

Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products

26

17

0

17

Manufacture of electrical equipment

27

54

0

54

Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.c.p.

28

35

0

35

Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers

29

48

0

48

Manufacture of other transport equipment

30

24

0

24

 

 

 

 

 

Manufacture of furniture

31

44

44

0

Other manufacturing

32

45

45

0

Repair and installation of machinery and equipment

33

25

25

0

TOTAL

 

1121

856

265

Table 12. Number of companies according to ISIC code (Source: Based on the information available in the database of the 2012 manufacturing innovation survey, own compilations)

 

 

Structural Model

Figure 3. Graphical representation of the PATH diagram for the structural model of all the companies (Source: PATH diagram applied to SMART PLS software)

 

 

 

Figure 4. Graphical representation of the PATH diagram for the measurement model of the companies with low and low-medium technological intensity (Source: PATH diagram applied to SMART PLS software)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5. Graphical representation of the PATH diagram for the measurement model of companies with medium and medium-high technological intensity (Source: PATH diagram applied to SMART PLS software)

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